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Abstract. 
Term limits in the Small Island States (SIS) is a subject that requires critical 
consideration. Do term limits truly matter for economic growth in Small Island States? The 
challenge of this issue escalates when there is demand for a stronger economy from the public 
in SIS, while their pool of competent candidates is often small in comparison to larger states. 
Scholars have extensively discussed the impact of term limits on the economy. However, their 
focus and results are generally limited within the large state dimension. There is a lack of 
empirical accounts testing the validity of such claims within SIS. This shortcoming is 
addressed by applying the principal-agent theoretical framework to identify the problem 
between voters and candidates, formulate the hypothesis of this study, and then suggest in the 
debate section the logic that underpins the basic assumption about term limits and economic 
growth in SIS based on the findings. The study uses a method of time-series cross-countries 
analysis, from 1987 to 2010. Using panel data from thirty-four SIS with maximum population 
of 10 million, I investigate the impact of term limits on GDP economic growth rate in simple 
and multiple linear regression models.  To test the fitness of models and robustness, three 
additional dependent variables are added: GDP per capita, revenue-to-GDP, and government 
spending-to-GDP. The study also performs robustness check to SIS with a maximum 
population of 1.5 million in order to compare with the results of 10 million population. The 
findings show that there is no statistical relationship between term limits and GDP economic 
growth rate. However, I found an interesting association between term limit and GDP per 
capita. Moreover, the findings show spending-to-GDP is the best model with a significant 
relationship in most of the independent variables. When robustness check is considered, the 
findings show revenue to GDP model has statistical significance than other models. Based on 
the findings, avenues for future studies are debated in the discussion and conclusion sections.    
 
Keywords: 
Term limits, GDP Economic Growth rate, Small Island States.   
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SECTION 1. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. A research puzzle.  
Ever been curious as to what influenced the recent constitutional change in term limit 
in Comoros and Dominican Republic? These two islands – the first located in the African 
region and the second in the Caribbean - undertook constitutional amendments in 2009 and 
2015 respectively. The reforms resulted in significant changes to presidential terms in office, 
each in a different way. The Dominican Republic opted for unlimited terms to allow the 
incumbent to countinously run for re-election, while in Comoros the new constitutional 
change resulted in a two term limits. Meaning that, the president can stay in office for no 
longer than two terms.  
Commentators and experts from various disciplines link the constitutional changes to 
economic prosperity, building on the manifesto campaign before the referendum, and the 
added articles in the amended constitution of both sides. In the case of the Dominican 
Repbulic, Zovatto (2016) noticed the inevitable victory for the reformed constitution due to 
the consistent increase of economic growth by 7.1 percent since President Danilo Medina 
came to power and successfully controlled inflation to 2.5 percent. Nevertheless, the motive 
behind the public’s support for Danilo’s unlimited terms was after gaining credit from the 
World Bank Projection ‘Dominican Republic At-A-Glance’1 as the best-performing economy 
in the region, alongside Panama, for the past twenty-five years. Nonetheless, Crosby (2015) 
suggests that the constitutional reform could have negative repercussions for the stability of 
the Dominican Republic and a detrimental impact on the economy.  
In the case of Comoros, President Ahmed Sambi anticipated constitution reforms of 
having unlimited terms as a way of holding simultaneous elections which seems too costly for 
poor small nations like one of Comoros. According to the president, allowing unlimited terms 
in a reformed constitution could allow the incumbent to consistently serve for the country’s 
economic policies and long-term plans while making changes of leadership could incur 
negative consequences to the econmy. However, when the referundum results came out, the 
peole (voters) determined to chose the two-term limit presidency, and not otherwise. A well 
                                                            
1 The World Bank (2018) Building Better Future Together: Dominican Republic policy notes. [Online] Available 
at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/dominicanrepublic/overview [Accessed 24 April. 2018]. 
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documented report written by Simmon Massey and Bakker and sponsored by Chatham House 
(2009)2 explaines the constitutional results in Comoros in length. 
The decision to undertake constitutional reform in any sovereign state remains a 
concern of the domestic domain. However, observing the different conclusions reached in 
Comoros and the Dominican Republic regarding term limits and their influence on economic 
performance raises puzzling questions on whether or not limited presidential terms actually 
impact economic growth in small islands. This question provides an opportunity for empirical 
analysis to explore the correlation between term limits and economic growth across time, not 
only in Comoros and the Dominican Republic but in a number of Small Islands States (SIS). I 
will depart from this angle by performing panel data multiple regression analysis to seek 
tentative results and perhaps develop a solution to the on-going constitutional reforms in the 
Small Island States.    
 
1.2. The Overview of the thesis.  
The desire to understand the causal mechanism between term limit and economic 
growth of Small Island States (SIS) is an uncommon one, as most attention is given to 
Mainland States. Here, Mainland States correspond to all sovereign territorial landmasses 
commonly referred as contiguous (Pionar and Cannatella 1987), while SIS considered in this 
particular study refer to all maritime sovereign islands, continental and oceanic, with an 
average maximum population size of ten million as set by Kuznets (1960) and minimum of 
1.5 million set by Commonwealth and World bank (2000). Most SIS appear to be invisible, 
marginalized and excluded by scholars in today’s mainstream comparative politics and 
international political economy (Veenendaal W. & Corbett, J. 2014), despite their potential 
economic and political contribution to the modern world (Barro, 1991; Erl & Veenendaal, 
2014). There are various reasons underpinning this exclusion, such as territorial size, small 
population, remote geographical locations and powerless influence in terms of economy and 
military at the global level.   
Though this perception of marginalization remains part of a broader debate, many SIS 
have similarities with large mainland states, especially when it comes to democratic practices 
                                                            
2 Simon Massey & Baker. (2009). Comoros: External Involvement in a Small Island State. Programme Paper AFP 
2009/1. Chatham House. [Online] Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/dominicanrepublic/overview [Accessed 25 April. 2018]. 
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and economic objectives. One of the primary commonalities is the presence of ‘term limits’. 
Nearly all democratic states set principles regarding the period that an elected leader can stay 
in power and when the period ends. In a democracy, term limits are utilized to address the 
problem of careerism and to develop competences (Crane, 1993). SIS set term limits similarly 
to other mainland states. An example of this similarity between mainland states and SIS in 
term limits let us take Tanzania and Cyprus.  
Term limits vary between states and are mostly dictated by the provision(s) in each 
sovereign state’s constitution (Basham, 2009; 1). These variations occur mainly in two main 
areas; the number of years that a leader can stay in office, and the number of terms a leader 
can run for re-election. For instance; in Comoros the leader is elected to office for five years, 
in Iceland a presidential term is four years’, while Singapore’s is six. Similarly, where some 
SIS (eg. Iceland and Singapore) have unlimited term limits, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, 
Fiji and Nauru have a finite term limit for the chief executive to run for election. This study 
focuses on the second variation: term limits. 
While term limit is one primary phenomenon, economic performance is another. 
Armstrong and Read (2003) give insights regarding the rise of a number of Small Island 
States in the global economy. In recent decades, there has been a significant rise in the 
economies of small states overall, due to increasing globalized networks and the emergence of 
large regional trading blocs (Armstrong and Read, 2003: 99). There are an overwhelming 
number of success stories of economic growth, despite the challenges the SIS face due to their 
size and vulnerability (Armstrong and Read 2003: 100). In 2017, for instance, the Global 
Financial Center Index ranked Singapore alongside the British Virgin Islands as a ‘first world 
economy’, due to the economic achievements they accomplished. 3  This economic trend 
stimulates interest in economic analysis of SIS specifically by focusing on annual GDP 
growth rate as an indicator a state’s economic strength.  
Varieties of publications have highlighted the statistical correlation between term limit 
and economic-related variables such as fiscal policy, total expenditure and national debt, 
(Besley and Case, 1995; Filc and Scartascini, 2006; Balassone and Franco., 2001; Dalle 
Nogre and Ricciuti, 2011). In their analysis, they have endeavoured to explain for these 
correlations in the United States (even if the US is irrelevant to this study, yet valuable source) 
                                                            
3 The Global Financial Centers Index 22, September 2017. 
http://www.luxembourgforfinance.com/sites/luxembourgforfinance/files/files/GFCI22_Report.pdf 
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by considering politicians as either opportunistic or public-spirited. Interpreting such 
correlation between term limits and economic performance results many politicians to seek on 
maintaining good reputation in check, so that to gain positive chances of entering or 
remaining in office, by winning (incumbent) elections. By comparison, voters demand to see 
economic progress as a means of developing trust for the incumbent. These mentioned studies 
reflect two-way preferences between voters and political candidates in their demand for 
economic progress. However, this academic pursuit of studying term limits and its effect to 
economy has less been enthusiastic in Small Island States (SIS), resulting in minimal 
progressive academic thinking beyond the point of speculation.  
 
1.3. Research Question and a brief method of analysis. 
This study aims to explore if there is a significant relationship between term limit and 
economic growth rate on SIS. Do term limits matter for economic growth in SIS? Between a 
new candidate and incumbent candidate, which one is most preferable for economic growth of 
SIS? Is there alternative model(s) that explain the performance of SIS economies best? Since 
most SIS have small amount of population in comparison with large state, it is then 
reasonable to argue that there is a small pool of competent candidates they can draw on after 
each end of the term. According to Aghion, Philippe & Jackson (2014:2) a competent leader 
is a type of leader that receives informative signals about whether a risky action is more likely 
to lead to positive or negative payoffs. Unlike incompetent candidates, the competent 
candidate or leader often receives the correct signal when approaching socio-economic 
problems, with a sufficiently high probability to succeed.  
In order to testify the validity of the claim; term limits impacts economic growth, this 
empirical research applies longitudinal data regression to measure how term limits determine 
economic growth. The panel consists of thirty-four SIS across time, 1987 to 2010. SIS were 
selected as an area of focus simply because they lack explanatory power in development 
studies and in research field overall. In order to explore the robustness of the model; I 
included seven controlling variables to regress with the main dependent variable; GDP 
economic growth rate. These control variables includes the historical colonizer, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), natural resources, natural disasters, trade openness, level of 
high-technology production, remoteness and insularity. More so, three dependent variables 
are added to contest for model fit by observing the strength of R-square and significant 
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correlations. Adding more dependent variable is also important for the multiple regression 
because it enables us to test term limit and other control variable with a different dependent, 
which may result to discover potential significant result.  
Data source such as World Bank, CIA World Factbook and United Nations Trade and 
Development facilitate to retrieve most of the data for the variables to be tested. I believe 
using empirical study provides a much-needed contribution to a field of research otherwise 
dominated by case studies. 
 
1.4. Social and Academic Relevance.  
Academic literature has traditionally put more weight on analyzing these same 
variables in mainland states (Anckar, D. 2002; Srebrnik, 2004; Besley and Case, 1995; Filc 
and Scartascini, 2006; Balassone and Franco, 2001; Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti, 2011). 
However, these close assessments done by previous studies did not take into account that 
there might be a differential impact of term limits for mainland states and SIS. For instance, 
Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) empirically investigated the effects of term limit with 
economic fiscal policy across 52 countries, from 1977 to 2000, using a panel data estimation 
strategy. The selection strategy of the countries was random and focused mostly on large 
developing states. This indicates that there is a gap in scientific knowledge concerning Small 
Island States. Examining the empirical correlation of term limits and economic performance 
in a setting of SIS, which differs from Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti, perhaps enables a different 
outcome that was not put into the account by either Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) or other 
scholars. Therefore, this study seeks to fill this gap in scientific research field. The product of 
this study may trigger a change in scope by scholars that are somewhat biased against SIS 
practices of term limit and economic performance.  
The testing of principal-agent theory on term limits and accountability of leaders has 
been extensive (Besley and Case; 1995; Elgie, 2002; Aghion and Jackson, 2016; Waterman 
and Meier 1998; Banks et al., 1998). For example, by taking a study of Elgie (2002), the 
author applied principle-agent theory as a heuristic device to identify both empirical and 
normative claims regarding accountability of the European Central Bank and democratic 
deficit. The central theme of location that Elgie specified is Europe under the institution of the 
European Union (EU). However, so far, none of the scholars have gone far to test the 
principle-agent theory through the lense of term limits in SIS. Expanding the application of 
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theory into SIS in this study could contribute to existing literatures with possible tentative 
results.  
In social terms, this study could contribute to what I call a “perceptional shift” for 
voters in regards to selecting which incumbent and model of term limit contributes to 
economic growth best in their respective SIS. A study by Aghion & Jackson (2016), Banks et 
al., (1998) and Elgie, (2002) explains considerable risky actions that voters might take which 
could results to costs. To abstain from negative consequences, the mentioned studies 
enlightens appropriate incentivizing tools for electing competing candidate. For instance, 
people from Comoros and Dominican Republic have decided the number of terms which a 
candidate or incumbent can serve for better economic growth. The product of this study, 
therefore, could stir voters from SIS in making decisive decision when confronted with 
similar constitutional reforms and elect the candidate whose policy they can rely on. The 
findings may also influence government policy bodies to re-assess their positions regarding 
executive term limits and decision regarding economic growth.  
 
1.5. Conceptualization of term limits and economic growth.  
Before digging deeper into the study, it is important to first define the primary concept 
of term limit. Additionally, I find it necessary to explain the term Small Island States (SIS) 
and how it is utilized in this study, since the core interpretation of ‘smallness’ is the subject of 
much scholarly debate. 
1.5.1. Term Limits. 
Term limit is not a modern formality; it is a concept with an ancient heritage that 
stretches back to the republics of Athens and Rome in the fifth century B.C (Harrison, 1959; 
Maltz, 2009). Further, it aligns with classical liberal models of limited and democratic 
government, valuing freedom of persons and free trade (Harrington & Pocock, 2008). During 
the colonial era from the seventeenth century, term limit was referred to as the ‘rotary system’ 
or the principle of ‘rotation in office’ that bound colonial officials. For instance, the charter in 
the New England Colony stipulated a limit on the number of years a leader could hold office.4 
These traditional proceedings have laid the groundwork for constructing a contemporary 
perception of term limits, with additional reforms and adjustments that suit the interests of a 
                                                            
4 A history of the working of the American government for thirty years, from 1820 to 1850: Benton, Thomas 
Hart, 1782-1858: Internet Archive. Retrieved 28 February 2018.  
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defined state. This brief historical account reappears later in this study as colonization 
variable when measuring robustness within economic growth.  
Today, term limits tend to be closely associated with regime performance and its effect 
on the adverse selection of economic policies. For instance, a comprehensive database by 
Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2015) collected contemporary data on a number of states that 
made constitutional changes after independence based on economic and regime interests. 
Some SIS placed a limit on the number of terms for executives to stay in power, while others, 
such as  Vanuatu, Malta, Mauritius and Suriname to name a few, favoured unlimited terms to 
run for office. Whereas some states (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica) embraced 
socialism - at least for a short-time period - as a mode of economic welfare, others 
incorporated their economy with bourgeoisie model of western states, such as Singapore. The 
adaptation of both regime system and number of terms by states all retained a focus on 
ensuring a progressive economy (Zhanga and Gao, 2008). 
When term limits were developed from obscurity, they started to attract more 
attraction and popularity from the public (Beyle, 1992). The idea of limiting the number of 
terms that the highest executive could serve in office was received positively by most people 
across the world. Term limits allow the public, who are also the voters, to gauge the strength 
of a candidate both before and after the post. On the other hand, a candidate under term limits 
becomes more committed and opportunistic. The candidate is capable of taking risks for 
incentive gains. These risks include policy choices in economic, political and social domains.   
Perhaps it is undeniable that term limits overall have resulted in elections that are more 
competitive (Basham, 2009). A number of new candidates keep rising to challenge the 
incumbents while the incumbents persistently keeps performing well to maintain their post in 
the office. For voters, the turnout has increased since the of pool of candidates is sufficient to 
allow choices that better correspond to voter preferences. Voter choice increases because term 
limits increase the number of candidates that seeks election. The product of a competitive 
election with term limits is the quality of representation that the majority of voters have 
chosen. Term limits have more advantageous effect on state legislative careers than 
previously thought. By increasing the number of experienced new candidates, term limits 
have minimized the benefits of demanding re-election to state executive, even to those 
incumbents eligible to re-run. Cummins (2008) went far by expressing that electoral 
competition helps countries to avoid budgetary problems. Overall, term limits have stimulated 
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more energetic candidates to continue stepping up, as well as voters to effectively choose the 
candidates of their own preference.  
This research aims to focus on two dimension of term limits: limited term and 
unlimited term. Crane (1990), and Coyne and Fund (1992), refer to limited terms as a fixed 
number of terms that are constitutionally set for an executive to serve. When the terms set by 
the constitution are over, an executive needs to leave office to allow other candidates to run 
for a same post. On the contrary, for unlimited terms, the number of terms are constitutionally 
not fixed, hence an incumbent can be re-elected by the voters as many times as possible. The 
common denominator that limited and unlimited terms share is that power is vested to people 
to decide through the ballot box. Crane (1990) emphasizes this shared similarity by adding 
that having the constitutional number of terms results in voters selecting a candidate who is a 
‘citizen-statesman’ and has a ‘citizen legislature’. In general, term limits produce politicians 
that are more representative and responsive.  
1.5.2. Small Island States.  
On the side of Small Island State, there is an existing conceptual contradiction 
regarding this term. Within academia, the distinction between Small Island States (SIS), Small 
States, and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is generally blurred (Armstrong and Read, 
2003: 100). There is little agreement in literature on the smallness of the state and the exact 
measurements, resulting in inconsistency and inaccuracy. I will try, however, to clarify these 
terms based on the contributions of various sources.  
Simon Kuznets (1960) sets the limit for ‘smallness’ of a country at a population of 10 
million and characterizes the population as socially homogenious with strong internal ties. 
Kuznets is considered to be an early scholar who set the limit for the smallness of a nation 
when addessing the economic vulnerabilities of small states and consequences due to the size 
of the nation.“… because of their smaller population, small countries have a handicap for 
economic growth” (Words of Kuznet (1960), as described by Eloi Laurent, 2008: 2).  
Demas (1965) raised the bar to 15 million in the attempt to link small state and 
international open trade. In 2000, the Commonwealth and World Bank established a new set 
of definition of small state by reducing to 1.5 million population or less (Commonwealth & 
World Bank 2000). The motive from World Bank of setting a bar of 1.5 million was due to a 
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special program devoted to nearly 45 developing countries in tackling the challenges of 
isolation, limited diversification and poverty. 
Sutton and Payne (1993) categorize a small state, be it an island or otherwise, not only 
by its geographical size but also habitual features. According to them, small states often tend 
to have conservative behavior and retain their traditional forms of economy and political 
representation either in their own right or alongside modern representative institutions (p.586). 
Examples of these states include Tonga, Bahrain, Micronesia and Marshall Islands, which 
show political activeness, hereditary, and traditional leadership. Because of the homogeneity 
of interests and political desires, most of the small states have limited opportunity for policies 
and dynamic ideas that threaten their status quo. In this regard, Sutton and Payne's 
conceptualization of a small state departs beyond a normalized thinking of physical size, by 
adding more about psychological behavior and habitual characters.  
Alesina and Spolaore (1997; 2003) take a different approach that includes empirical 
analysis on describing the scale of smallness of a state and how big a nation ought to be. Their 
studies partially overlap with Sutton and Payne (1993) when it comes to cultural and habitual 
homogeneity. Alesina and Spolaore argue with empirical evidence that the higher the ties in 
culture and public goods between individuals, the greater the chances for positive correlation 
with the size of the country. Unlike large states, which are heterogeneous, small countries are 
relatively homogenous with public choices that are close or similar to individual preferences. 
Small countries are simple to identify since they often have a habit of producing public goods 
that are a close fit to all the members of their small population.  
Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) are maritime geographically located states, 
categorized as a distinct group of developing countries facing special social, economic and 
environmental vulnerabilities (UN-OHRLLS report, 2013). According to the UN, there are 57 
SIDS nations, 37 of which are UN members.5 However, it is important to understand that not 
all SIS are SIDS members, but all SIDS members are SIS.  
Therefore, Small Island States in this study encompasses all maritime sovereign 
islands, with a maximum population size of 10 million as set by Kuznet, (1960) and as 
defined by the United Nations under the SIDS platform.  
                                                            
5 Sustainabledevelopment.un.org. (2018). List of SIDS .:. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. [online] 
Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list [Accessed 7 Mar. 2018]. 
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The structure of this paper is organized as follows; there are total of 7 sections. Section 
one consist of introduction of the topic and conceptualization. The second section consist of 
the literature review that explores the contribution from previous literature together with the 
uncovered gaps. The third section discusses the theoretical framework linking the cases, 
principle-agent theory, and hypothesis to the theory. The fourth section on research design 
includes methodology, case selection and data collection. Then I compute the relationship of 
the variables in section five under the name of empirical analysis. Section 6 consist of 
discussion based on the findings. The final consist of conclusion and offers some area for 
future studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
SECTION 2. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Overview of Existing Research. 
Today, the debates about the effects of term limits on economic growth are subtle, and viewed 
as a double-edged sword based on the heterogeneous opinion of scholars. A closer look shows 
that there are two major camps with conflicting ideas on term-limits. Some scholars claim that 
having term limits has a positive effect on a growing economy, while the other camp argue 
that term limits are damaging to economic growth. For the sake of clarity, I refer to the first 
camp of scholars as ‘Orthodox’ for backing a standard set of finite rounds for the chief 
executive to stay in power, as suggested by Jeffrey Knopf (2006: 129). Meanwhile, the name 
‘Unorthodox’ represents scholars in favour of unlimited term-limits for better results. 
 
A. Orthodox stream of literatures (Pro-limited terms) 
To most of the orthodox stream of literature, the primary focus is closely associated 
with the moral hazard of a leaders accountability and the nature of multi-party elections as 
confrontational and competent. Goodin and Lepora (2015) developed a skeptical assessment 
toward unlimited term politicians, especially in unconsolidated democratic states. According 
to them, there is often a potential risk that any election may well be the last with minimum 
reassurance to other competent leaders that ‘their time will come’ (p.365). Przeworski (2015) 
develops the idea further, suggesting that unlimited terms could increase the ability for a 
repeatedly victorious politician to manipulate electoral law and policy in such a way as to 
perpetuate their position in power. Przeworski references Mugabe of Zimbabwe and the likes 
of Museveni of Uganda as leaders that never succeeded in causing the country’s economy to 
flourish, despite being repeatedly re-elected and successfully reforming electoral laws (p. 102). 
His experiment concludes that there is a high probability for incumbent rulers to turn 
themselves as verdict to people, unchallenged in decision-making, and having powerful effect 
in shaping belies of political prospect, if term limits are not set.  
Johnson and Crain (2004) found across a number of different countries observed 
between 1972 and 1990 that the size of government expanded more rapidly in countries with a 
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defined term limits than the undefined, along with competence effect of a leader. Further 
studies show that the incumbent in limited term governments tends to work with more 
sincerity in their final term (Figlio, 1995; Tien 2001; Snyder and Ting 2003). Even in the 
judicial field, Gordon and Huber (2007) explain that judges in a partisan competent system 
with term limits tend to sentence more punitively than those in a retention (unlimited term) 
system. Glazer and Wattenburg (1996) extended the remarks to the global level, arguing that a 
world without limited terms spoils the future by creating excessive incentives for politicians 
to secure their re-election. They argue that term limits reduce the value of gaining re-election 
and induce politicians to focus more on legislative work. 
Also from an economic perspective, orthodox scholars Ely and Valimaki (2003) 
advocate for a fixed term limit as a solution for continuous market failure of a state. Ely and 
Valimaki made an observation in a market economy in which long-lived players interact with 
a series of short-lived players, and the results showed that there could be complete market 
failure if the long-lived players are too concerned about their future reputation (p.801). This 
demonstrates a need to avoid the excessive reputation of incumbents who are more likely to 
put the market economy in jeopardy.  In a similar vein, in a frequently cited publication of 
Besley and Case (1995a) on gubernatorial term limits, the findings showed in the U.S, the 
capital spending and taxes were high under term limit between 1950 and 1986. However, in 
2003, the authors revised their analysis on the same sample but over an extended time period, 
through the mid-1990s, and conclude that having term limit does not negatively affect the 
economy, suggesting other omitted factors may attribute to the cause. 
 
B. Unorthodox stream of literature (Against limited terms) 
The core position of the unorthodox scholars relies on the competence of a leader and 
deny that term limit improves politics (Kinsley, 1990). The absence of term limits empowers 
voters to retain their incumbent choice, whose level of competence has increased over time 
with experience (Padro i Miquel & Syder 2006). A regression model by James Alt, Ethan and 
Shanna Rose (2011) with variety of economic and political control across states across 
countries finds that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are 
lower under re-election-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents. An 
investigation into Brazilian mayors found that in the last period of office, those who were 
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eligible for reelection engaged in less corruption than term-limited mayors (Ferraz & Finan, 
2011).   
In a different study, Besley and Case (1995b) found a significant correlation between 
unlimited term and economy precisely when incumbents apply the strategy known as “a 
yardstick competent” in winning voter’s choice. Most voters around the world make a 
comparison between home state and other foreign states on the increase or decrease of taxes. 
This results to the behavior of yardstick competition between states, each caring what others 
do. Therefore, when incumbent performs well in regulating the tax movement, playing a 
better off than neighbour states, (s)he has higher chances to win trust and repeatedly win 
elections. The point here is that unlimited terms allow the competent incumbent to endure 
successful regulation of tax economy in home states, presuming the incumbent has done well 
in tax economy in the past records than other states.    
Another rival explanation against limited terms is offered by Presley (1990), arguing 
that finite term limits are a waste of talents and experience. Presley indicates that a state could 
run a potential risk of losing a talented experienced leader who can revive the socio-economic 
welfare of a state for the sake of having a finite term limit. The study done by Cohen and 
Spitzer (1992) used Presley’s comment that; ‘the newly elected leaders take a long time to 
learn the more intricate aspects of a legislators job particularly budgeting’ (1992;482). The 
additional sizeable study shows when countries set a limit of rounds a chief executive can run, 
most these officials tend to “shirk” in their final terms prior to their retirement. The word 
“shirking” is defined in terms of reduced effort, such as voting less frequently (Vanbeek 
1991).  This means fixed term limits produce unresponsive representatives in the “lame duck” 
term. Moreover, executives who know that they will leave office soon tend to worry about 
their prospects after leaving (Polsby, 1991). As a result, these executives curry favour with 
special personal interests, utilizing the public resource for personal interest, particularly with 
firms that might hire them after  constitutional constraints force them to retire.  
 
Scholars’ common ground. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that both camps contributes to a greater 
scientific understanding of term limits. Both orthodox and unorthodox plays a common role 
of exploring term limits and its significances. The two camps of scholars pave the way of 
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further scientific study which correlates term limits with other parameters, such as assessing 
the impact of term limit to economic performance. Scholars also raises the subject of 
accountability in term limits, and it provides a way for the public to elect the leader they seem 
fit to carry out progressive economic policies. Therefore, all relevant scholars agree having 
either unlimited or limited terms contributes to the positive transition of power enhancing 
people to elect a favourable candidate through the ballot. Thus, overall the literature bring 
conventional wisdom that is applicable to this research, to say the least.   
 
2.2. Identification of the Research Gaps. 
The above literature review provides a general overview of the centre of this research 
and are an important preliminary step for the hypothetical assumption. However, we find that 
most of literatures focused on the U.S and excluded SIS. The reason of focusing in the U.S 
perhaps, there are many variables that are similar and constant in all fifty states. Hence 
simplicity in finding and regressing multiple variables. In SIS, there are variables that exist 
uniquely to all islands, for instance external shocks and climate vulnerability. This study seek 
to pursue control variables that co-exist in most of islands while regressing with the economic 
growth and alternative dependent variables that this research reflects. 
In addition, the contribution provided by the Orthodox scholars are comprehensive and 
accurate, yet do not explain why unlimited terms countries like Singapore, flourish in their 
economies. Likely because term limit is not a single factor affecting economic performance. 
This study attempts to add more factors as controls, such as natural resource, remote, trade 
openness in order to find other possible explanations for rapid economic performance in 
Singapore and other SIS.  
2.2.1. Is the literature insufficient?  
The literature discussing exclusively term limits and economic GDP economic growth rate are 
also less extensive. But scholars have integrated term limits with different economic models 
and factors that could assist in guiding this research. Because we are going to include some of 
those economic models in fourth section, it is convincing then to add those literatures in the 
same section, in order to avoid repetition of same information. Nevertheless, some additional 
literatures will also appear while analyzing the results of our study in fifth section.  
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SECTION 3. 
 
3. Theory 
3.1. Theoretical Framework. 
Introduction of the theory. 
The principle-agent theory has been the core basis for an extensive set of disciplines 
related to political science, sociology and economics in a wider range of explanations 
(Mitnick 1973, 1975; Moe 1985; Wood, 1988; Sholz and Wei 1986). The economic 
originality of the theory itself is defined as the contractual relationship between buyers 
(principals) and sellers (agents) within the market system; each with the goal of rational utility 
maximization (Ross 1973; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Charles Perrow, 1986).6 Meanwhile, in 
an alternative classical form, the principal-agent theory determines the relationship between 
two characters: principal and agent, where the principal is an individual(s) that hires the 
agent(s) to perform a task(s) that the principal do not have sufficient time, information, money 
or ability to perform by themselves (Mitnick, 1986; 4). Richard Waterman (1998) speculates 
the principal-agent theory is an ‘infectious’ idea, as once the general concept is understood, its 
application can spread into a diverse range of analytical cases from various disciplines and 
research studies. In short, principal-agent theory has developed to be a significant analytical 
tool for examining a vast array of real-world challenges.  
Assumption of the theory.  
The assumption of the theory as explained by a plethora of scholars (Elgie, 2002; 
Keser & Willinger, 2007; Moe, 1985; Worsham, Eisner, & Ringquist, 1997; Gailmard, 2012: 
Waterman & Meir, 1998) is also the basic start of the situation. It occurs where actor(s) who 
are the ‘Principal’ have an incentive to assign power to another actor, the ‘Agent’, with the 
hope that the latter will subsequently act in a way that is consistent with the initial preferences 
of the former (principal). The incentive to assign power is normally motivated by a desire to 
minimize transaction costs. Delegation to the agent occurs to save on transaction costs, but 
adverse selection is rather a consequence of delegation. Adverse selection in relation to our 
                                                            
6 The original form and in its simples vision of Principle-agent theory as describes by Charles Perrow; The theory 
assumes that social life is a series of contracts. Conventionally, one member, the ‘buyer’ of goods or services is 
designated the ‘principal,’ and the other, who  provides the goods or service is the ‘agent’-hence the term 
‘agency theory.’ The principle-agent relationship is governed by a contract specifying what the agent should do 
and what the principal must do in return, (1986,224).  
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thesis topic of term limits refers to the situation where voters (principals) cannot necessarily 
know and acknowledge which competent candidate is best qualified to be a leader (agent). 
Provided that all candidates running for the post will try to sell themselves in equal way, the 
voters may well elect a candidate whose price is greater than their economic value (cost-
output). Moral hazard occurs when voters does not know how effective a candidate will be 
once he/she has been elected. In other words, voters simply cannot observe everything that the 
candidate does and desires.  
 
3.2. Integrating the theory with term limits.  
Given these problems, the closest solution is to design a contract – i.e. establishing 
(term) limits - that provide an incentive for the candidate to perform efficiently. In theory, 
when such a contract is well-established, then only competent candidates who are truly 
qualified will (re)run for the post (incompetent candidates will not) and, once elected in office, 
there will be no need for voters to monitor a competent leader’s behaviour. Hence, principal 
agent theory provides a suggestion rectified by Calvert et al. (1989: 590 – 1): in an ideal 
situation, well chosen agents, in an agency constructed to channel their incentives correctly, 
can be left alone to determine the policy that the elected officials would themselves have 
chosen, given the time and resources. Therefore, delegation of power from voters to 
competent candidates remains a rational act in an institutionalized world, given that the 
contract determines the time (limited or unlimited terms) and resources (economy) a 
candidate can explore. 
Recently, political scientists have integrated the theory into a broader institutional and 
bureaucratic setting and diverted away from just being economic model. These bureaucrats 
involve politicians, legislators and public administrators, where most attention is focused on 
the problem of moral hazard (Waterman, 1998; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011). 
Politicians as agents tend to raise the so-called ‘shirking’ problem; a form of noncompliance 
to the initial objectives set by the public voters, who are also the principals. This results in a 
conflict of goals between voters and politician(s) (McCubbin, 1987; 410). The politician’s 
decisions could depart from the agreed position by either legislature or executive under his 
own discretion after being elected. Alternatively, the agent may encounter an issue known as 
‘agency slippage’. This occurs when the structure of issuing power (delegating power) itself 
brings perverse incentives for the candidates to act in a way that is unfavorable to the 
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preferences of the voters (Pollack 1997). In agency slippage, it is not the competent candidate 
(the agent) that divert from the principal’s preferences, but rather the decision-making 
mechanism of the institution is shaped in a way that diverges from the objectives of voters. 
Therefore, the agent could have a good faith in pursuing the general objectives of the 
principal, but the system does not allow him to do so.  
How does Principal Agent Theory fit with Term Limits and economic growth?  
In answering this question, let us apply the principal agent theory to the topic of term 
limits and economic growth in Small Island States. I use the theory as a heuristic device 
(Elgie, 2002) that helps demonstrate and identify the assumption(s) that underpin the research 
question and hypothesis of this study.  
Term limit positions are consistent with the level of faith that there has been no 
candidate (agency) shirking or slippage problem. It can be said that through term limits, 
principal (voters) delegate sole authority to a candidate for the purpose of increasing the 
economy through policies that they sold during their campaign. In doing so, the candidate has 
been entrusted with the expressed preferences of the voters (the principal) during the moment 
of delegation. Hence, on that basis, the theory can be understood to suggest that term limits, 
through an entrusted candidate, do impact economic growth. The dilemma, however, occurs 
within the duration of the contract (limited or unlimited), and asymmetrical information that 
the agent has to behave.  
Let us stress the logic behind the candidate’s delegated power from the principal. In 
this point, it is important to notice that once the candidate has been vested power from voters, 
he (the candidate) enjoys autonomy and operational independence. Often, in many principal-
agent studies, agent autonomy slippage or shirking goes hand in hand. In fact, the assumption 
of principal-agent theory is that the more autonomy an agent enjoys, the higher the 
opportunity it has to act according to self-centered interests and deviate from the preferences 
of the principal (Elgie, 2002: 190). But for SIS, the assumption might be argued in a 
somewhat dissimilar case. In SIS, the competent agents that match with the principal’s 
preferences are small in number. In other words, there is small pool of competent candidates 
for the post, since, by nature, SIS are small in size and small in terms of population.  As a 
result of this, it creates weaker competition due to somewhat limited number of qualified 
candidates in SIS.  
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The theory indicates a puzzle based on the uncertainty of asymmetric information 
between agent and principal, and also the impasse of shirking agents. An incompetent 
candidate having imperfect information on how to run the state either could raise effort to 
improve his policy before his term ends or otherwise could induce less optimistic behavior to 
the principle. In this regard, when the voters are unsure about incumbent behaviour, they may 
assess the period of first term in office as a gauge to measure the performance of the 
incumbent. If the incumbents desire is to remain in office, due to the influence they obtain in 
determining policy, then the probability of re-election will affect their economic choices 
(Besley and Anne, 1995; 770). For the issue of shirking, the uncertainty rises among 
principals when the agent is not guilty of shirking and still capable of manipulating public 
votes. Since the agent holds the autonomy of the state, he may forge the election results to 
favor his preferences and change the principal’s contract to indulge his partialities. In this way, 
the principal-agent theory may suggest that the agent has acted in undemocratic manner, 
beyond term limit principles, and perhaps impact the economy negatively.   
The principal–agent approach is a useful background for understanding the argument 
about term limits: the relation between candidates and voters and their impact on economic 
growth. I expect this theory to help to identify which underlying basic assumptions of the 
hypothesis are correct and which are acrimoniously debatable. We should expect intuitive 
results.   
Literatures of Principles Agent theory and Term Limits.  
Previous literature suggests a number of scholars with similar beliefs when combining 
the theory with term limits. In the earliest period, Barro (1970) observed electoral results and 
the role of incumbents, while Banks and Sundaram (1993) advanced the theoretical approach 
based on unobservable efforts by incumbents in pursuit of building a good reputation. A 
recent extension of the framework by Harrington (1993) looks at distortions in economic 
policy choice indicated by elections. Additional scholars made clear attempts to link principal 
agent theory with economy and electoral behaviors. In their attempts they developed models 
that show that particular policy choices are delivered as a result of a yardstick competent and 
asymmetric information between incumbents and voters within political business cycles 
(Coate and Morris, 1993; Rogoff, 1994; Besley and Case, 1995).  
Besley and Case’s (1995, 2003) theoretical evidence on electoral term limits and their 
impact on economic policy choices appears to be a useful model for state leaders and 
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members of the public seeking appealing directions. Besley and Case’s reputation-building-
model faces criticism. Scholars (Cane-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts, 2001; Maskin and Tirole, 
2004) also speculate that, from the reputational-building model, re-election results can alter 
incumbents’ policy choices in a way that is harmful to the electorate’s welfare, pandering rule 
of law and causing policy distortion. 
Critics of the theory and alternative explanations.   
Given symmetric information between the agent and principal, Dutta & Yanni (2017) 
showed the probability of an agent’s acceptable behavior to the society, following his signal. 
These symmetric inflows bring two-folded benefits: they generate the highest first term 
expected payoff to the society and they reveal whether the agent is competent. However, the 
asymmetrical and symmetrical revelation of information is what creates an incentive problem, 
since an agent caring only about remaining in office may disregard his signals or choose safer 
actions, thus avoiding the chances of being revealed as incompetent and, henceforth, facing an 
ouster (p.7).   
Kurfirst (1996) has developed other plausible normative frameworks regarding term 
limits that are useful in this research, namely; term limits progressivism and term-limit 
populism. Beginning with term-limit progressivism, Kurfirst upholds the progressive 
movement ideal of an expert professional legislature with the objective(s) of restoring good 
governance and policies’ implementation. In other words, progressivism simply defends the 
leadership of legislative professional expertise in order to produce stability, whereas definite 
term limits weaken the executive system and internal leadership. Accepting professionalism 
indicates voters prefer stability and efficiency to participation (Cain and Levin 1999: 168) 
more than just having constant ‘fresh new faces’ in power. However, Petracca (1992) reacts to 
this normative framework by arguing as a corrupted ideology. According Petracca, 
professionalism invites candidates that put much effort for reelection above the public good. 
Petracca (1992) speculates that most political scientists are skeptical toward finite term limits 
as they perceive them as a threat to their self-proclaimed status as professional, for example, 
by rejecting their advices.  
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3.3. Hypothesis.  
The main testable hypothesis.  
H1- There is a significant relationship between unlimited terms and economic growth 
of SIS, assuming that the competent agent cares about public preferences and balancing the 
egoistic payoff. Here the principal prefers to extend the contract to the agent as incentive 
achievement due to the fact that agent has bounded rationality and production of public goods. 
The principal should expect increases in economic growth from the agent.  
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SECTION 4. 
 
4. Research Design 
 
4.1. Case Selection. 
The panel consists of 34 sovereign small island states that are examined in this 
research. These islands are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Fiji, 
Grenada, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica, Kiribati, Ireland, Iceland, Malta, Mauritius, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia Federal State, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, 
Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga 
and Vanuatu. As noted, The selection strategy ensured that all regions of the world—Africa, 
the Middle East, the Caribbean, Europe, the Asian Pacific region, and Central America—are 
covered. The reason for this is to provide credible results without isolating any region, not to 
mention the objective of minimizing selection bias. Selection bias occurs when omitting 
individuals that represents similar features with those selected from the study (Corinna & 
Mehryar, 2014). The islands are picked based on several criteria. First, online data 
accessibility of all variables that this paper aims to find was essential. Another criterion is the 
independent recognition of the islands as sovereign states by many other states. Because of 
this, some islands with resounding economic growth such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, the British 
Virgin Islands, Niue and Zanzibar to name a few are not included in this study. Furthermore, 
the research selected a combination of SIS that are geographically located near a continental 
shelf and those located far from the continent (Oceanic). The reason of combining the 
distance factor is to enhance the coherence of the results.  
However, it should be noted that there are some SIS for which it is debatable if they 
truly practice term limits, for example the decision to include Bahrain and Brunei Darussalam 
in the research. Some could argue that the two countries are monarchic systems and highly 
authoritarian, without term limits. Hence, the two countries are irrelevant especially if term 
limits is concerned. This argument is permissible and critical. However, Brunei Darussalam 
and Bahrain are included in the research database that this paper collected the data. The 
database is the World Bank’s Database of Political Institution (DPI; Beck et al., 2001), which 
constitutes countries that practice term limits and those that do not. DPI overall is a 
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comprehensive source supported by the World Bank serving as a pool for data in the 
discipline of comparative political economy. As Bahrain and Brunei Darussalam are included 
in the aforementioned database as countries practicing either limited or unlimited term limits, 
I have included them in this research as well. 
With thirty-four SIS in this thesis study, I established a panel with conventionally 
large-N cross-countries dimension (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). I opted for large-N 
research in order to demonstrate a compelling explanation that fits the model of all variables 
included accurately. Ray (1995: 134) supports the decision of using a large-N experiment in 
empirical studies when arguing that having a large number of cases to analyze often leads to 
results beyond the theme of the topic, as long as all interpretations of a case have testable 
implications for the related case.  
 
4.2. Method of Analysis. 
Investigating the impact of term limits and economic growth in a number of SIS over 
20 years requires a longitudinal research design for vigorous results (Hsiao, 2003, 2014). 
From a longitudinal study, we will observe the same subjects over a long period in order to 
identify correlations between term limits and economic growth. Longitudinal data often 
enables researchers to understand the variation of complex models in-depth, as well as to 
extract more information. Additionally, longitudinal data, also known as panel data, could 
discover if there is any turning point of either a problem or benefit and could show the 
disparity of the population: years before and years after a certain effect. The major 
weaknesses of using longitudinal data, according to Todd et al, (2014) which are also 
important to address in this study are; firstly, it can usually only make statements about 
association of variables rather than causation; secondly, it is frequently-time consuming to 
collect data; and thirdly there is less space for either intervention or manipulation of variables. 
However, it all depends on the research. One could think of fixed effects model which allows 
for causal inference.  
The panel time survey is carried out from 1987 to 2010 for two reasons. Firstly, the 
period allows us to filter and sort at least a minimum of three years of observation in terms of 
executive changes of a country. In other words, if a SIS has a seven-year constitutional limit 
the executive can serve before new elections, a timeframe of 1987 to 2010 lets us observe 
changes of regime three times, and measures the changes in economic growth. Of course, the 
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results of the measurement will be redirected afterwards to the constitutional portfolio of that 
particular country, whether it allows term limits or not.  
The second reason is data constraints. In most cases, in our panel, the countries lack 
data prior to 1987. SIS are particularly prone to this missing data problem, often caused by 
lack of recordings before 1987 due to either the ruling system during that particular time or 
technological limitations (Nakagawa, 2015). Therefore, in order to get a balanced panel with 
the statistical power of a study and no missing data, at least on the main independent and 
dependent variables, starting from the year 1987 serves best for case.  
Since it is a panel data study, which indicates that the research aims to observe 
changes of variables overtime, then study intends to apply between random-effects model 
(Pooled OLS) and fixed effect model. In order to find which model will dominate our 
research, Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is a statistical hypothesis tool that will identify 
which model is the best to apply in our case. The null hypothesis (Ho) that Hausman Test 
considers is that the preferred model is random effects. Thus, there is no correlation between 
the unique errors and the regressors in the model. The alternative hypothesis  (H1) is that the 
model is fixed effects. Meaning, there is a correlation between the two. If Hausman test 
identifies random effect (Pooled OLS) model as best for our study, then this means, there is 
no unique attributes of individual within the measurement set as well as no universal effect 
across time to impact our research. In Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis, then it applies 
fixed effect is appropriate. In other word, there are unique attributes of individual that varies 
across time (Hsiao et al, 1999).  In our case then a fixed-effect would assist in assuming 
differences in intercepts of term limits across SIS. For instance, in our panel, the variation of 
differences is observed in some of the contries namely Comoros, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, and Suriname. However, for now it early to tell about the fixed effect until Hausman 
approves in empirical section as good model of analysis.  
 
4.3. Research Approach.  
Linear regression model is the core method of analysis that this paper will utilize. A 
linear regression model is a quantitative research method that is used when the research 
involves modelling and variable analysis. The assumption of linearity is simple: there is a 
linear relationship between an independent and dependent variable. Linear regression analysis 
enables the researcher to find how significant the correlation is and forecast the best model.  
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4.3.1. Hausman Test. 
Before computing the relationship, the study first performs Hausman test to identify 
which effect between Random and fixed is the best for our study. The Hausman test in 
longitudinal data can assist in choosing between a random effects model or fixed-effect model 
(Hausman, 1978). The null hypothesis (Ho) that Hausman Test considers is that the preferred 
model is random effects. There is no correlation between the unique errors and the regressors in 
the model. The alternative hypothesis (H1) is that the model is fixed effects. Meaning, there is a 
correlation between the two.   
4.3.2. Simple linear regression. 
When estimating a difference in GDP economic growth rates, which have a continuous 
annual outcome, and term limits, which have categorical features (limited or unlimited), a 
simple linear regression is often used to test the parameters. This study will firstly show a 
simple linear regression model, where the variable of interest will be tested. The objective for 
this regression is to estimate the significance of the association between term limits as 
predictors and the level of economic growth. The general assumption that we pursue in this 
simple linear regression is that a change in economic growth is correlated with the change in 
term limit. In simple linear regression it is difficult to prove that there is a cause-and-effect 
relation between the predictor and the outcome. Since it is a simple linear regression, the 
study will therefore apply a basic form of regression equation:  
Y = Β0 + β1 X + ε 
In an expanded form:  
GDP economic growth rate = β0 + β1 (term limit) + Predictor error  
Where Yi is denoted as dependent variable, which for our case is economic growth 
rate. It is a variable whose value depends on all term limit and other covariate parameters in 
the equation. In view of the fact that the model is linear regression, the dependent variable is 
said to be continuous.  
X denotes the independent variable of term limit, that assists in explaining the variance 
in the economic growth rate. The independent variable, term limit, is divided into categories: 
unlimited and limited.  
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Β0 is the constant or intercept. This is a predicted value of the outcome when all other 
explanatory variables are equal to zero.  
β1 is the slope of the independent variance, also known as regression coefficient. 
ε is an error term (predictor error), which tests the fitness of the model.  
β0 and β1 are both considered as parameters to be estimated.   
4.3.3. Multivariable linear regression. 
In most cases that aim to address a problem and seek potential solutions within research, the 
contribution of a single independent variable is not sufficient to explain the dependent 
variable. Therefore, the study will incorporate multivariate linear regression to investigate the 
effect of multiple variables on the dependent variables. Our basic assumption that drives this 
multiple linear regression is that an estimated change in economic growth (or additional 
dependent variable that will be introduced later) is associated with two or more predictor 
(control) variables. However, the process of adding more control variables without theoretical 
and literatures consideration may reduce the credibility of the work. In this regards, the 
variable added in this study associates with the character of SIS.  
Multivariable linear regression also covers the subject of collinearity. Collinearity 
(also known as multi-collinearity) simply occurs when there are high associations between 
two or more explanatory variables. A good way to detect collinearity is by computing the 
regression coefficient of all parameters. The results obtained from this method should 
determine whether the collinearity is perfect or otherwise, and which variable should be 
detached from the model, if possible.  
Below is the basic equation of the multiple linear regression. 
Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2  + β3 X3  + ε 
In Expanded Form:  
Economic Growth = β0 + β1 (term limit) + β2 (colonizer) + β3 (Natural resource rent) + 
β4 (ODA) + β5 (Trade Openness) +… + residual 
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4.4. Robustness Check.  
Kuznets (1960) has put into account that the smallness of a state encircles within the 
population of 10 million. Meanwhile Commonwealth and World Bank considers a small state 
if the population does not exceed 1.5 million. After performing panel regression that includes 
all thirty-four SIS with a population to 10 million, this study will then perform robustness 
check analysis for SIS with maximum population of 1.5 million. The reason of applying this 
approach is to examine how certain ‘core’ regression coefficient estimates behave when the 
regression specification is either change or modified some way, typically by eliminating or 
adding regressors (Lu and White, 2014: 194). Moreover, we apply robustness check to 
observe how our conclusion change when certain individuals are dropped and to demonstrate 
whether our previous analysis were fine. A result that the coefficient did not change in either 
of the regression is considered to be an evidence that these coefficients are robust and 
commonly interpreted as evidence of structural validity (p. 195). 
 
4.5. DATA 
In an ideal world, research experiments would be perfect if they did not come across 
any problem concerning data. However, this is not the case, for there are always challenges. 
In our study, two major challenges occur in relation to data, which are important to address at 
the outset. The first challenge is concerned about the uncertainty of the data. Most of our data 
is not exact, and consistently differ between sources that recorded the data for our study. For 
instance, the IMF and World Bank have the most-used databases for many scholars in this 
field. However, when comparing GDP growth rates as recorded by the IMF to those  recorded 
by the World Bank, for instance, data of the same year varies between the reported sources. 
Because of this problem, most analysis often falls on the threshold of being biased and 
irrelevant to reality.  
More so, the problem of missing data is another challenge. Most scholars and 
academic researchers fail to acknowledge the missing data problems for fear that their work 
may be perceived either as weak or less credible (Van Buuren, 2012). This study faces similar 
challenges of missing data and acknowledges the importance of addressing it. Variables such 
as high-technology manufactured for export and trade openness have high levels of missing 
data. I will explain this in-depth when introducing variables in the next sub-section. 
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4.5.1. Variables and Data Collection.  
Variable Selection in Multiple Regression Model.  
As explained in the introduction section, our main area of focus is primarily on Small 
Island States. Thus, almost all of the independent variables are selected based on their close 
contribution to small island’s economies. In that regard, the control variables are picked based 
on close relationships with, or influence on, GDP economic growth rate of SIS. Several 
articles assisted in finding credible variables for measuring the economic performance of 
island states. A study of economic vulnerabilities in small islands by Lino Briguglio (1995) 
contributes in indicating quantified index for measuring economic vulnerability with a 
number of policy recommendations for economic resilience. Other prominent scholars and 
experts on economies of SIS include Bertram (1986), Armstrong and Read (2003), Campbell 
& Hall (2009), McElroy & Morris (2002) and McElroy & Parry (2010). I selected nearly all 
variables from the studies conducted by the aforementioned scholars.  
When regressing the multiple linear model, three additional dependent variables are 
set to find robustness and a best model for the study. Our target in multivariate regression is to 
measure if one continuous dependent variable can be predicted from a set of explanatory 
variables. This means how much variance in our continuous dependent variable is determined 
by a set of independent variables. There are two main selection criteria for the additional three 
(continuous) dependent variable are: (a) The nature of the research: The research's overall 
primary target in seeking (a) determinant(s) that foster(s) economic performance of SIS. In 
that regard, GDP per capita, spending-to-GDP, and revenue-to-GDP have been widely 
speculated as useful determinants in measuring the economic success of country (Read, 2002; 
Briguglio, 1995); (b) The second selection criteria is the suggestion from the literature. As 
shown in the literature review section, most scholars attempt to study the correlations and 
causality between term limits and different economic factors. Among others, Besley and Case 
(1995, 2003), Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011) and Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) 
have studied term limits and their impact on spending-to-GDP, revenue-to-GDP and GDP per 
capita.  
Therefore, there are six independent variables (including main independent variable), 
and four dependent variables in total (including main dependent variable). I formulate a 
model by regressing each of the dependent variable with the six-predictor variables. Four 
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models should be expected in the empirical results section. Below is the description of the 
variables:  
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
i. GDP economic growth rate (main dependent variable of interest).  
GDP economic growth is the main outcome variable that this paper emphasizes. The 
reason behind its selection is that it is considered as an acceptable measure of a country’s 
economic progress by vast swath of literature (Costanza et al., 2009: Marcus & Kane, 2007; 
Armstrong & Read, 2003: Bruguglio, 1995).  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) overall is an 
estimate of market throughput, which consists of the value of all final goods and services that 
are manufactured, traded, and delivered, for money, within a defined period of time 
(Constanza et al., 2009; Armstrong and Read, 2003). Growth percentage rate indicates the 
expansion (or shrink) of an economy based on the total value of all goods and services 
produced over a specific time-period (Kitov, 2006). GDP growth rate’s value can be easily 
identified due to the increasing or decreasing of economic performance of a state, however, 
this indicator is limited in expressing the standard of living of each individual nonetheless.  
Applying GDP economic growth rate to measure the quality of economic performance 
has some weaknesses. According to Kuznets (1934), GDP economic growth is measured only 
by monetary transactions, hence portraying an incomplete picture of the system within which 
the human economy operates. Furthermore, researchers consistency of using GDP overall to 
measure the progress of economy depicts a ‘threshold effort’: it has a negative impact of 
lowering community cohesion, connection with nature, healthy relationship, knowledge and 
other dimensions that encircles human happiness (Max-Neef 1995; Talberth, Cobb et al. 
2007). In this study, GDP economic growth is applied in SIS nonetheless.  
The data for GDP economic growth rate is collected primarily from the World Bank7. 
For the SIS with missing data from this data source, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)8 
is used to fill the missing gaps as a secondary source of data. Therefore, there is no issue of 
missing data for this variable, hence a balanced panel. This variable is measured by 
percentage rate, collected from each year and it is a continuous variable.  
                                                            
7 Data.worldbank.org. (2018). GDP growth (Annual %) | Data. [Online available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG [Accessed 03 April. 2018]  
8 World Economic Outlook Database (2018). Real GDP Growth. | Data. [online available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD?year=2018 
[Accessed 5 April, 2018]. 
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ii. GDP per capita.  
The indicator, GDP per capita, is mostly used when comparing the economic situation of 
individuals in a country. It shows an average income of a person that is derived from a 
country’s economic output relative to its population (Boulhol et., 2008). The indicator has 
also been applied to term limits in previous studies (e.g. Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti, 2011) 
with promising results, at least on large states.  
GDP per capita as an income-based measurement has been discredited (Armstrong & 
Read, 2003: 108) as an adequate indicator providing a long-term structural and institution 
scale of economic performance of small islands. Briguglio (1995) explains that GDP per 
capita fails to capture the unique problem of vulnerability that small states struggle with on a 
daily basis. But these speculations are rejected by a study of McElroy and Morris (2002) 
when exploring African islands' economic development experiences. The study found GDP 
per capita continuously rising by 50 percent higher than continental countries (p.41). 
Cockerell (1995) found similar positive findings on GDP per capita income in relation to 
tourism. Moreover, the fact that GDP per capita has often been measured in line with 
vulnerabilities of SIS as discussed above (see Briguglio, Armstrong and Read), switching to a 
more political variable by testing GDP per capita and term limits may produce tentative 
outcomes. Thus, the results may lead to a new direction that was previously not given enough 
attention. Most people assume that the higher the GDP per capita of a country, the greater the 
likelihood of having a better life. However, this is not always the case (Dasgupta, 2009) 
This (continuous) dependent variable is applied to regress with term limits as well as 
other control variables. It is measured by the US dollars currency and is labelled as model 2. 
The data is collected from the World Bank9 as a key data source. In a few cases such as 
Micronesia Federal State and the Marshall Islands, data was missing from the World Bank, so 
the IMF10 database was used to fill the gap. 
 
                                                            
9Data.worldbank.org. (2018). GDP per capita (current US$) | Data. [Online available at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.CD&country= [Accessed 10 
April, 2018]. 
10 World Economic Outlook Database. (2018). GDP per capita, current prices U.S Dollars | Data. [Available 
online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD?year=2018 
[Accessed 10 April 2018].  
39 
 
iii. Government spending-to-GDP 
Barro (1990) describes government spending as the total government expenditure on 
final goods and service. The indicator combines all the investment expenditure by the 
government: salaries to civil servants, purchases of military equipment and other development 
project expenses. When government spending is incorporated with GDP to become spending-
to-GDP, foreign transfer payments made by the government are taken into account. The 
reason is that GDP is a measure of productivity within the national borders of a certain 
country and these types of payment do not reflect purchases made by the government for 
goods and services inside the country, but rather an overall movement of income (Holm, 
1990).  
In regards to term limits and spending-to-GDP, scholars give supportive empirical evidence 
that this study could rely on. Payne's (1991) study shows that the longer the incumbent 
individual remains in office, the greater the support for increased government spending. Reed 
et al. (1998) explain the consequences of limited terms as reducing the special competences of 
executives in performing better spending policies. The updated results of Besley and Case 
(2003) from the previous study of 1995 shows that term-limited governors tend to 
significantly increase country spending. Tanzi (2004) indicates positive signals in research by 
arguing that when spending-to-GDP is correlated to term limits and higher taxes, it often 
generates robust results. On the contrary, findings by Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) show 
that term limits have no effects on government spending and surplus. Chief executive does not 
seem to play a big role in shaping spending of the government.   
The presence of spending-to-GDP as a dependent variable adds to the third model. The 
variable is presented in percentage rate and it is a continuous variable. Again, the addition of 
this dependent variable aims to find a strong model fit. There are missing data in this variable. 
To some SIS, the variable lacks data from 1987 to 1990. The closest explanation appears to be 
a lack of recording of this data. The central database to collect the data for spending-to-GDP 
is the IMF,11 though the World Bank12, which enabled some data in some of the missing 
values. 
                                                            
11 World Economic Outlook Database. (2018). Government expenditure, percent of GDP (%) | Data. [Available 
online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/exp@FPP/USA/FRA/JPN/GBR/SWE/ESP/ITA/ZAF/IND/TUR?year=201
1 [Accessed, 23 April 2018].  
12 Data.worldbank.org. (2018). Expense (% of GDP) | Data. [Online available at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS&country= [Accessed 
27 April 2018]. 
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iv. Government revenue-to-GDP 
The OECD database (OECD, 2018) describes revenue-to-GDP as a variable that 
indicates the share of a country’s outgoing that is collected by the government through taxes. 
In most cases, it is considered as one of the measures with which the government controls the 
economy’s resources.  
A number of political economy scholars have debated extensively regarding fiscal 
revenues of a government and its relation to governors and chief executives. For example, 
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) shift their focus to a lame 
duck leader by arguing that in a limited term an out-going chief executive, a lame duck, 
extracts next term’s fiscal revenues and uses the revenue for his or her preferences. 
Consequently, in unlimited terms an incumbent would encourage saving the revenue to 
implement policies promised during the incumbent’s election. On the contrary, Crain and 
Tollisson (1993) found that governors under limited terms have a more significant effect on 
revenues and budget deficit than governors with unlimited number of terms. Empirical studies 
by Johnson and Crain (2004) and Besley and Case (1995) provide evidence that a term 
limitation results in higher government expenditure and higher government revenue.  
Government revenue-to-GDP stands as our fourth model that regresses the predictor 
variables. The variable is continuous and measured by percentage rate. The data is collected 
from the World Bank13 data source. However, this variable also consists of missing values in 
the early years (from 1987 and through the 1990s). The extent of missing data differs from 
one SIS to another.  
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
i. Term Limits (Main Independent Variable of interest). 
Term limit in our study has binary features (0, 1), hence a categorical variable. It is 
measured by observing whether the state has either limited (fixed) terms or unlimited (unfixed) 
terms from the period of 1987 to 2010. Those SIS with limited term limit will be named ‘Yes’ 
and coded 0 while the SIS with unlimited term limit will be named ‘None’ and coded as 1.  
                                                            
13 Data.worldbank.org. (2018). Tax Revenue (% GDP) | Data. [Online available at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS&country= [Accessed 
3 May 2018]. 
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The primary source of data for term limits is the constitution of each country. 
Whenever there is a difficulty in understanding the constitution of a certain country, due to 
either language barriers or an inability to find the article regarding limits of executive officer, 
the CIA Factbook14 and Database of Political Institution (Beck et al., 2001) served as a 
secondary source. The problem of missing-value in this variable was not observed.  
 
ii. Colonial Ruler  
Colonial rulers are foreign imperial powers considered to hold control in all important 
aspects; socio-economic and political, until a colonized state gains its independence. Many 
colonized states have similar traits and even sometimes indirectly dictated by the colonial 
rulers. For example, the post-British and French colonization in Africa and other parts of the 
world led to the emergence of economic policies that favour the system of specialization of 
commodities, as used commonly by British and French during the colonial period (Austin et 
al, 2016; Frankema & Williamson, 2015).  
I have listed each state with its former colonial ruler while assigning categories to the 
SIS that belongs to the same colonial ruler. For SIS which had more than one colonial ruler, 
such as the Dominican Republic that was colonized by Haiti and later Spain until 
independence, the last colony to colonize a certain state before independence is the one that 
this study prefers. The primary data source used for this variable is the CIA Factbook, while 
the secondary source, used mainly for confirmation and assurance, Wimmer & Min (2006) 
facilitate this need.  
 
iii. Insularity and Remoteness.  
Insular is defined as the territorial landmass with direct access to the sea or ocean, 
while remoteness can be defined as the average weighted distance between two countries with 
weights reflecting the absorptive capacity of the partner country (Borgatti, 2007). I use 
insularity and remoteness as a control variable to find out how geographical factors such as 
the location of the SIS influences the economic performance of SIS.  
                                                            
14 The World Factook, (2018). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2018. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2088.html  
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In this study, the degree of insularity and remoteness dimension is measured based on 
the distance of the analyzed SIS from the nearest continent. The assumption is, the closer the 
island to the continent, the higher chances for economic growth. I categorize this variable into 
binary characters; SIS that is beyond the average of one thousand kilometer (1000km) from 
the continent, I categorize it as “Remote” and record it as ‘0’ and the SIS that is less than one 
thousand kilometer (1000km) distance from the continent, I categorize it as “Not remote and 
record it as ‘1’. 
The method of collecting data is not straightforward, since complete information on 
insularity and remoteness is quite rare and disperse. I favor mostly the United Nation 
Environment Programme (Unep) and Worlds Island Info databases that are repeatedly used in 
most empirical, studies (Armstrong et al, 1998; Bertram and Karagediki 2004; Vania 2013).  
 
iv. Trade Openness 
The term ‘small open economy’ often favors the Small Island States due to limited 
capacity of producing volumes of surplus goods and services for the world market. 
Manufacturing industries produce specified products as demanded for the domestic market, 
with high degree of openness to trade upon imports (Marcy, 1960; Scitovsky, 1960; Triffin, 
1960).  
The puzzle between the successful and unsuccessful side of degree of trade openness, 
brings interest on finding the correlation between the degree of trade activities, import and 
exports, and economic growth. To capture this level of trade exposure, I choose the trade-to-
GDP ratio as a determinant indicator for the measurement. Trade-to-GDP ratio is calculated 
by dividing the aggregate value of both imports and exports over a period by the GDP for the 
same time-period. The data will be collected from the year 1987 to 2010, from World 
Integrated Trade Solution15 as a primary source. Whenever a shortage of data of a certain 
country occurs, World Bank and International Monetary Fund would act as a secondary 
(alternative) source of data.  
 
                                                            
15 Word Integrated Trade Solution, 2018. Trade to GDP ration. |Data| available at 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/country/by-country/startyear/LTST/endyear/LTST/indicator/NE-
TRD-GNFS-ZS [Accessed 6 May 2018].  
43 
 
v. Natural Disaster. 
Disasters create additional to cost and may disrupt the whole economy (Briguglio, 
1995). The major root causes for disaster proneness and vulnerability to natural hazards on 
SIS are well-documented in literatures (Chambers, 1995; Glantz, 1976; Hewitt 1983, 1997; 
Sen 1981; Gaillard, 2007, 2010; Wisner et al. 2004, 2012). The objective of this variable then 
is to test and observe how the variation of natural disasters affects the economy growth in this 
study. This variable is frequently connected to SIS due to the vulnerability that most islands 
suffers, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, fire, volcanic eruption, climate 
change, and landslide naming a few. 
The gauging countries’ level of natural disasters ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 stand for 
‘stable’ from natural disaster, meaning that a state has never been reported with any natural 
disasters. Number 2 is for ‘unstable’: in a sense that a country has been reported with one or 
two disasters and number three is ‘critical’ with more than two reported cases of natural 
hazard. The data is collected from the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction16.  
 
vi. Official Development Assistance.  
Small Islands are the most aid dependent states in the world (Dornan & Pryke, 2017). 
The aid targeted here is in terms of financial aid, mainly funded from Official Development 
Assistance17 (ODA) in forms of loans and grants. There is historical connections and benefits 
between ODA and most small islands that is traced back since the end of the Second World 
War (Riddell, 2007) and it functions parallel to MIRAB18 economic theory that suggests a 
nearly central role for aid in funding government expenditure and service delivery for 
economic growth (Lewis, 2013). However, as time passes by, some SIS have stopped using 
ODA for different reasons such as economic success.  
                                                            
16 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018. Data Available at 
https://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/statistics/ [accessed 6 May 2018]. 
17 ODA is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as government aid 
that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. 
(OECD.org, 2018). [Online] Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf [Accessed 14 April 
2018].  
18 MIRAB economic model is an acronym Migration, Remittance, (foreign) Aid, and (public) Bureaucracy.  
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I use ODA to measure the targeted SIS of this study and assess the performance of aid 
to economic growth across time. The data used is collected from World Bank Database while 
the indicator is net ODA received in percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). 
 
vii. Natural Resource.  
Natural resource has been one of the important source of national wealth for any state. 
Since the end of Cold Ward, most developing states have reformed their economies, 
especially the extracting sectors and non-renewable resources, with the assistance of the Word 
Bank (Onorato et al. 1998; World Bank,1992, 1996). This has resulted to a direct flow of 
capital investment and income in the natural resource sector, with progressive economic 
growth and sustainable development.  
The indicator that will measure the presence of natural resource is values of non-
renewable exports as used by Ibrahim-Shwilima (2016). (one sided and unwarranted). I obtain 
the data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)19 available 
under merchandise trade-matrix category. The data however, are available only from the year 
1995 and not before, which results missing data from 1987 to 1994, hence unbalanced. 
 
viii. High-manufactured technology for exports.  
The level of manufactured technology is our last variable for this study, but certainly 
not the least. The objective of investing in technology industry is highly driven due to 
overwhelm difficult challenges, such as climate vulnerabilities, that SIS face. Important 
emphasis in technology industry in SIS is given to renewable energy sector, fishing 
technology, greenhouse projects in order; (a) to combat with unpredictable vulnerabilities and 
ensure resilience (Bishop, 2012) and (b) to waive trade imbalances by exporting most recent 
technological innovation to other parts of the world (Marjoram, 1991). In most of tropical 
islands, Bahamas for instance, manufactures Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion and Deep 
Ocean Water system, which may be used in generating electricity and addressing natural 
disasters in advance (Osorio et al., 2016).   
This control variable is used in multivariate regression model to seek whether it has 
significant correlations with term limits. The variable is measure by percentage rate and the 
                                                            
19 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2018). Natural Resource – Merchandise trade Matrix 
| Data. [Available online at: http: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=24741 [Accessed 4 May 2018]. 
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data is collected from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).20 
 
 
Term limits 
Colonizer 
ODA 
Trade Openness 
Natural Disaster 
Natural Resource Rent 
High-technology Manufactured Export 
 
Fig. 1. Models for the quantitative panel regression –whereas the blue box on the right 
shows our dependent variable (the variables that is tested or measured). The white box on the 
left shows independent variables (variables that can explain the change in dependent variable). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
20 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2018). High-technology manufactured exports | 
Data. [Available online at: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/dimView.aspx [Accessed 4 May 
2018].  
GDP Economic Growth rate 
GDP Per Capita 
Revenue-to-GDP 
Spending-to-GDP 
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SECTION 5. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis. 
  
In this section, we compute the relationship and explore the regression results of simple 
linear regression and multiple linear regression of all thirty-four countries. The analysis begins 
with the Hausman Test to define our model of regression, between either fixed effect or random 
effect (Pooled OLS).  
 
  ---- Coefficients ---- 
  (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
   
 CatTL -.8439308    -.6053752       -.2385556        .7089704 
   
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
 Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
  chi2(1)  = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
    =        0.11 
  Prob>chi2  =      0.7365 
 
Table1: Hausman Test: Fixed-Effect & Random effect. 
 
The table above shows the p-value is 0.7365, which is above the 0.05 significance level. This 
indicates strong evidence to favor the null hypothesis; in other words, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore a random-effects specification is appropriate for individual-level effects 
in our model. Having no missing values for the regressed variables of interest indicates the 
comforting result that pooled OLS is superior for our study. 
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5.1.  Simple Linear Regression.  
 
 (1) 
 DGDPGrowthrate 
CatTL -0.506 
 (0.321) 
  
_cons 3.694*** 
 (0.259) 
N 812 
R2 0.003 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 1: Pooled OLS – Term Limits and GDP growth rate.  
 
By looking at the main variables of interest, term limit and economic growth, the 
simple linear regression shows that there is a no relationship between term limits and 
economic growth. This means, having unlimited terms does not impact the growth rate of the 
economy, hence this relationship is not statistically significant. Since the term limit is coded 0 
or 1, with 0 for limited and 1 for unlimited, the interpretation in the simplest form would be: 
for unlimited the predicted score is five points lower than limited terms.  Because there is no 
relationship, there is not much to discuss here.  
 
5.2. Multiple Linear Regression.  
In this sub-section, the study aims to answer two important questions:  
i. Which other predictor variables, besides term limit, influence the change in 
outcome variable in a significant way, and to what extent?  
ii. Which model fit best in explaining the strong association between variables? 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GDP 
Growth 
rate 
GDP 
Growth 
rate 
GDP 
Growth 
rate 
GDP 
Growth 
rate 
GDP 
Growth 
rate 
GDP 
Growth 
rate 
Term Limits -0.546 -0.835* -0.805* -0.901** -0.866* -0.422 
 (0.320) (0.330) (0.342) (0.342) (0.343) (0.398) 
       
Colonizer -0.0837 -0.0295 -0.00178 0.0101 0.0172 0.119 
 (0.0802) (0.0814) (0.0876) (0.0872) (0.0873) (0.0998) 
       
Remoteness & 
Insularity 
-0.961** -0.772* -0.521 -0.814* -0.816* 0.0193 
 (0.336) (0.338) (0.355) (0.367) (0.367) (0.453) 
       
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
 -0.0442** -0.00766 -0.00891 -0.00375 0.0333 
  (0.0135) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0345) 
       
Trade Openness   0.0257*** 0.0311*** 0.0322*** 0.0243*** 
   (0.00539) (0.00566) (0.00572) (0.00696) 
       
Natural Disaster    1.049** 1.072** -0.642 
    (0.356) (0.357) (0.434) 
       
Natural resource 
rent 
    -0.0280 -0.0588* 
     (0.0217) (0.0298) 
       
High-technology 
manufactured 
     -0.00860 
      (0.0130) 
       
constant 4.207*** 4.567*** 2.920*** 1.130 1.069 3.495*** 
 (0.319) (0.336) (0.497) (0.784) (0.785) (0.921) 
N 812 812 753 753 753 436 
R2 0.017 0.030 0.051 0.062 0.064 0.066 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 3. Pooled OLS –GDP economic Growth rate model.  
 
The regression of table 3 is the estimated model of the control variables to GDP 
economic growth. In this table we observe that trade openness and natural disasters have a 
significant relationship to the economic growth of SIS. Despite not being variables of interest 
to this study, it is worth briefly exploring these associations.  
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Beginning with trade openness and economic growth, it has a coefficient of 0.0257. 
This indicates that when an SIS increases the degree of openness to trade (imports and exports) 
and integrates with international economy, there is 0.027-unit increase of GDP economic 
growth rate while holding all other variables constant. It also has a coefficient of 0.0243 when 
all variables are regressed (see GDP economic growth column 8), together with a strong p-
value of less than 0.05. This result is interesting when linking to what some scholars have 
argued. According to the empirical study conducted by Tumbarello et al (2013), trade 
openness has increased over time and integration has benefited the SIS in the Asian Pacific 
and the Caribbean by allowing them to import capital goods such as energy and food, while 
countries such as Fiji, Samoa, Bahrain and Vanuatu have a high number of trade exports. A 
study by McGillivray, Naude, and Satos-Paulino (2010: 818) explores the trade flow in SIS. 
The empirical analysis indicates that commodity exports and imports relative to GDP are far 
higher in SIS in comparison to all other Developed Countries and Less Developed Countries 
between 1980 and 2007. For SIS, small national economies and deep integration into world 
markets make SIS particularly open to the vicissitudes of experiencing economic 
globalization (Fairburn, 1999). Earlier studies of Triffin (1960), Helleniner (1982) and Marcy 
(1960) had similar views regarding the urgency of integrating SIS to open trade at the 
international level. The ideas of significant relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth are weakened by Naude (2009), Santana et al. (2007) and Saayman et al. (2009), all of 
whom argue that trade openness does not provide an immediate effect on the economy, hence 
suggesting other determinants such as the role of government.  
For natural disasters, the results are remarkable and raise some points of interest. The 
coefficient is 1.049, which means a significant relationship between natural disasters and 
GDP economic growth rate. A simple interpretation of this would be that for every unit 
increase in a natural disaster, a 1.049-unit increase in GDP economic growth rate is predicted, 
holding all other variables in account. There is controversy of the results of natural disasters 
and economic growth in the literature. Pelling and Uitto (2001) engage in a deep analysis of 
natural disasters and economy in small islands. The results of their studies had two 
interpretations: firstly, islands with repeated disaster shocks are the ones that also experience 
unstable economies and weak political institutions (page 20). Secondly, islands that had 
suffered a single yet catastrophic natural disaster had the highest relative loss in economy. 
The second interpretation favors our results more than the first interpretation. Pelling and 
Uitto point out Singapore as an exceptional case. It is the only island state in their study that 
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did not experience a disaster, with a relative low level of exposure to physical risk and 
relatively high levels of economic development and infrastructural capacity (p.50).  
Additional scholars such as Burton et al. (1993), Giddens (1984), and Bryant and 
Bailey (1997) have applied natural disasters and vulnerability through the lens of political 
economy and human ecology approaches. There is a connection of these results to the work of 
Ilan Noy (2009) who addresses the consequences of disasters in macroeconomics. Ilan Noy 
stresses that countries with higher literacy rates and stable economies are better able to 
withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillover to economic calamities. 
However, the variable of natural disasters in our study is just a control variable and not the 
central focus of interest.   
The rest of the control variables—Colonizer, remoteness and insularity, ODA, natural 
resource rent and high-technology manufactured for export—are not significant. The 
coefficient of these variables is negative, which are not significantly different from zero, 
making no impact on the main dependent variable.    
The R-square of the above regressed model is 0.066, which is significantly low 
making it hard to rectify it as a good model. Nevertheless, there were an average number of 
SIS with missing data on trade openness and natural disasters due to data accessibility, which 
were removed during the regression process. As a result, the interpretation of the above 
outcome could be viewed as less cohesive. The remaining control variables have less impact 
in determining the dependent variable, and so have been skipped.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
DGDPp
ercapita 
Term Limits 2559.5** 2411.1** 2182.1** 204.7 -
3
8
2
.
9 
-359.7 -182.3 55.54 
 (782.7) (784.4) (721.0) (706.9) (712.0) (714.5) (712.2) (1032.6) 
         
Colonizer  -430.0* -37.85 497.1** 572.0** 567.2** 603.5** 768.2** 
  (208.7) (194.6) (190.8) (195.9) (196.4) (195.5) (257.9) 
         
Remoteness & 
Insularity 
  -
9001.0**
* 
-
7546.4**
* 
-
6669.7**
* 
-
6588.1**
* 
-
6578.7**
* 
-
9166.3**
* 
   (751.4) (722.1) (734.8) (760.0) (755.2) (1171.4) 
         
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
   -
296.3*** 
-
264.8*** 
-
264.5*** 
-
238.8*** 
-
576.2*** 
    (29.60) (34.15) (34.18) (34.90) (89.08) 
         
Trade Openness     85.42*** 83.84*** 89.20*** 39.12* 
     (11.09) (11.70) (11.75) (18.08) 
         
Natural Disasters      -310.6 -197.5 2690.4* 
      (733.0) (729.2) (1125.0) 
         
Natural Resource 
Rent 
      -141.7** -164.1* 
       (44.31) (76.88) 
         
High-technology 
manufactured 
       194.5*** 
        (34.09) 
         
Constant 7038.3**
* 
7960.2**
* 
10085.7
*** 
12284.9
*** 
7719.7**
* 
8258.8**
* 
7966.3**
* 
6039.6* 
 (635.8) (776.4) (735.2) (726.1) (1030.3) (1637.4) (1629.7) (2398.8) 
N 776 776 776 776 735 735 735 431 
R2 0.014 0.019 0.173 0.268 0.326 0.326 0.336 0.405 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4: Pooled OLS – GDP per capita model. 
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Switching to GDP per capita as a dependent variable with term limit as the main 
independent variable of interest, we observe a significant correlation between the two 
variables. To every increase unit of term limits, there is a coefficient of 2559.5 unit rise for 
GDP per capita. In other words, when putting the variable into a bi-dimensional plot, x-axis 
and y-axis, and x-axis (term limit) has a measurement unit from 0 to 1, then more the variable 
moves to 1, which is unlimited in our case, the higher the chances of GDP per capita 
increasing as well. Hence this is a significant model. The result however is bivariate; there in 
nothing else held constant (ceteris paribus). Because of omitted variable bias, term limit loses 
significance when you control for other variables, which means that the correlation found in 
the bivariate model is spurious (confounded by some third variables).  
This association of term limit and GDP per capita has support from the literature but 
not extensively to SIS. A study by Besley and Case (1995) indicates that when a governor in 
the U.S faces a term limit, the level of GDP per capita increases by three percent in 
comparison with the governors that are eligible to stand for reelection repeatedly. A panel 
data model generated by Carter and Nordstrom (2016) between term limits, leader preferences 
and GDP per capita shows that there is a strong correlation between GDP per capita and 
limited terms, especially when a democratic leader is electorally accountable. The findings 
from the aforementioned scholars match with the results of table 2 on term limits and GDP 
capita.   
When regressing the GDP per capita with the rest of control variables, we find 
remoteness and insularity, trade openness and high-technology manufactured for export have 
a positive relationship. In other words, these control variables are helpful in explaining the 
variance of GDP per capita and term limits, and are hence worth having in our model. This 
corresponds to Sufrauj's (2011) clarification of how geographical distance and strategic 
locations of SIS could determines the level of GDP per capita in relations to eco-tourism and 
trade relations. The relationship between technology flow and GDP per capita in Small 
Islands is also mentioned by Sufrauj and Keller (2001) in length. There are three asterisks 
(***)21 to each of the control variables that positively correlate with the dependent variable, 
which means the p-value is less than 0.001, hence statistically significant. But for ODA, 
natural disaster, natural resource rent and colonizer have insignificant correlations with GDP 
per capita. Again, in this case, it is important to acknowledge the fact that in most data 
                                                            
21 The asterisks are commonly used in statistical output to represent ranges of the p-value, where *** means 
the p value is less than 0.001; ** if the p value is less than 0.01; and  * if the p value  is less than 0.05  
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sources there is missing data for most control variables such high-technology manufactured 
for export and ODA; were the data not absent, there may be different interpretations. 
Nevertheless, the variables are again just control variables and not the main point of interest. 
For the model fit the R-squared of all regressed data is 0.405, which is equivalent to 
40.5 percent. Based on this result, the model is good, at least when compared to the previous 
model, GDP economic growth rate. This result triggers extensive further study with the two 
variables.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue 
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Gvt 
Revenue
GDP 
Term Limit 63.10 61.35 70.67 79.93 89.34 87.33 51.01 -4.687** 
 (100.1) (100.2) (100.3) (102.8) (108.4) (109.0) (109.3) (1.569) 
         
Colonizer  -10.98 -20.65 -24.10 -21.69 -21.41 -24.01 0.412 
  (24.91) (25.50) (26.87) (28.45) (28.50) (28.39) (0.391) 
         
Remoteness & 
Insularity 
  180.2 170.0 175.2 168.3 163.0 -3.154 
   (104.9) (107.8) (114.1) (119.6) (119.1) (1.790) 
         
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
   2.033 3.024 3.056 -1.015 0.376** 
    (4.956) (5.769) (5.775) (5.951) (0.140) 
         
Trade Openness     0.0888 0.202 -0.360 -0.0312 
     (1.663) (1.762) (1.766) (0.0274) 
         
Natural Disaster      22.42 8.893 -4.411* 
      (114.4) (114.0) (1.710) 
         
Natural 
resource rent 
      18.29** 0.0351 
       (6.904) (0.117) 
         
High-
technologyman
ufactured 
       0.135** 
        (0.0510) 
         
constant 34.38 57.68 14.35 4.952 -14.44 -52.65 -16.12 35.43*** 
 (81.30) (97.01) (100.1) (102.7) (154.1) (248.6) (247.9) (3.620) 
N 696 696 696 696 665 665 665 428 
R2 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.107 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 5. Pooled OLS – Revenue-to-GDP model.  
  
Here, the relationship between term limits and revenue per GDP is significant, because 
the estimate results tell us that the amount increase of revenue per GDP would be predicted by 
a 63.10 unit increase in term limit, as in this study, the unlimited term gets the predicted score 
of sixty-three points higher than limited terms. The results do correspond with the work of Alt, 
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Bueno de Mesquita & Rose (2011). They found negative evidence of limited term effect and 
accountability. Their suggestion and conclusion showed that government revenue is lower 
under term-limited incumbents that under those who are eligible for re-election. Nevertheless, 
they found that the general performance improves with the incumbent’s tenure in office (p. 
182). Besley and Case (1995) also confirms the association between revenue and voting 
behavior towards incumbent. Their study demonstrates that, when the voters observe the 
incumbent's effort regarding reduction of government tax revenues and increasing policy 
choices, the likelihood for incumbent to be re-elected increases. Their results also encourage 
the view that vote-seeking that is needed by incumbents, and revenue-reduction that is 
demanded by voters, are tied together through the nexus of yard-stick competition. 
Government revenue appears to be a significant determinant of who is elected and the policy 
choices that a candidate will pursue. The R-squared and the p-value of revenue-to-GDP and 
term limit is not strong enough to declare the association as effective. 
Regarding the multiple regression, perhaps this is the only model that shows many 
control variables having a significant relationship with revenue-to-GDP, with only the 
Colonizer variable having a negative correlation. These variables are remoteness and 
insularity wherein, with every unit increase in remoteness and insularity, revenue-to-GDP is 
predicted to be 180.2 units higher. Also, for every unit increase of ODA, the predicted value 
of revenue-to-GDP is 2.033. For every unit increase in trade openness, a 0.0888 unit increases 
in revenue-to-GDP. For natural disaster, for every unit increase in a natural disaster, a 22.42 
unit increase in revenue-to-GDP is predicted. Additionally, for each unit increase in natural 
resource rent, there is a predicted 18.29 unit increase in revenue-to-GDP and an average of 
0.135 unit increase in revenue-to-GDP for every unit increase in high-technology 
manufactured for export. But for every unit increase in ODA, revenue-to-GDP is predicted to 
be 10.98 units lower.  
On the subject of p-value and R-squared of the regressed model of all variables, the 
result is 0.107 which is significantly low, so it can be contemplated as a bad model. However, 
it is important to notice that the number of observations (N) dropped to 428, which mean 
some of the data were not included in the regression due to a missing-data problem. Only 
natural resource rent and high-technology manufactured for export show p-values below 0.05 
and hence statistically significant relationships to revenue-to-GDP.    
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Gvt 
Spending
GDP 
Term Limits -3.168*** -2.356*** -2.354*** -0.987 -2.070*** -1.352** -1.262* -1.893*** 
 (0.784) (0.680) (0.659) (0.661) (0.559) (0.494) (0.494) (0.541) 
         
Colonizer  2.729*** 2.415*** 2.159*** 1.105*** 1.015*** 1.034*** 0.877*** 
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.163) (0.143) (0.126) (0.126) (0.136) 
         
Remoteness & 
Insularity 
  5.111*** 4.216*** 1.693** 3.792*** 3.790*** -0.515 
   (0.692) (0.678) (0.580) (0.530) (0.529) (0.616) 
         
Official 
Development 
Assistance  
   0.209*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.321*** 
    (0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0238) (0.0244) (0.0469) 
         
Trade 
Openness 
    0.00703 -
0.0321*** 
-
0.0292*** 
-
0.0378*** 
     (0.00880
) 
(0.00819
) 
(0.00826
) 
(0.00946
) 
         
Natural 
Disaster 
     -7.604*** -7.545*** -3.656*** 
      (0.515) (0.514) (0.590) 
         
Natural 
resource rent 
      -0.0735* -0.00387 
       (0.0313) (0.0404) 
         
High-
technology 
manufactured 
       0.0159 
        (0.0176) 
         
constant 22.02*** 15.79*** 14.79*** 13.09*** 15.29*** 28.31*** 28.16*** 23.15*** 
 (0.633) (0.665) (0.659) (0.673) (0.811) (1.134) (1.133) (1.251) 
N 816 816 816 816 757 757 757 436 
R2 0.020 0.266 0.312 0.359 0.220 0.396 0.400 0.301 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 6: Pooled OLS Government spending-to-GDP 
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The table above shows that for every unit increase of term limit, a 3.168 unit decrease 
in spending per GDP is predicted. Having a coefficient closer to zero in two pairs of variables, 
one can be confident of estimating the model as statistically significant, with no variable to 
control. The p-value of the association shows three asterisks which means less than 0.001 
(p>0.001). This provides evidence for the presence of a strong relationship, and so for a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. The supposed null hypothesis here is that there is no 
relationship between term limit and spending-to-GDP. The regression confirms the estimated 
effect of term limit and spending-to-GDP.    
In the empirical study of Alt, Bueno de Mesquita & Rose (2011), which focused in-
depth on government spending, incumbents' behavior and term limits found that government 
spending is higher under reelection-eligible incumbents than limited-terms incumbents. The 
study reflects with the results found in this study, making it interesting in the case of Small 
Island States. As said above in the coefficient results, with every unit increase in term limit, 
from 0 to 1 (0 being limited and 1 unlimited), there is an estimated decrease of 3.168 units in 
government spending-to-GDP. In other words, with an increase of incumbent leader to be 
reelected under unlimited terms, there is a 3.168 likelihood reduction in government spending. 
The importance of this result is heterogeneous. Not only does it enable an  improvement in the 
way of thinking about mechanisms through which term limits affect spending-to-GDP, but 
also such estimates are critical for thinking about why unlimited terms matter in a society with 
a small pool of candidates. One of the potential answers is that it reduces government 
spending. The results are also consistent with the empirical finding that voters are normally 
‘fiscal conservatives’ and often punish incumbent candidates for rapid spending as well as tax 
growth (Besley and Case 1995; Peltzman 1992). 
Colonizer in this model has a significant relationship with government spending-to-
GDP, with a p-value below 1 percent which indicates the presence of a strong significant 
relationship, holding other variables constant. Colonizer has a coefficient of 2.729 which 
means that for every unit increase in colonizer (ranging in category from 1 to 7), there is a 
2.729 increase in government spending-to-GDP. Amongst all other model, colonizer has a 
significant correlation only with spending-to-GDP. The results suggests that SIS that were not 
colonized by the United Kingdom (which is grouped as number 1 in categorical variable), 
there is likely to be a 2.729 increase in government spending.  
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There are similar significant relationships with a p-value below 1 percent to 
remoteness, insularity and ODA. Trade openness and high-technology manufactured for 
export have been distinguished as having a significant relationship while natural resource rent 
and natural disasters do not have statistical correlations with government spending-to-GDP. 
The R-square of the accumulated variables is 0.301 which is low, hence a bad model. 
However, colonizer, ODA and all others mentioned with significant relationships are only 
control variables in this study, and are not of main interest.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GDPGrowthrat
e 
DGDPpercapit
a 
DgvtRevenueG
DP 
DgvtSpending
GDP 
Term Limit -0.422 55.54 -4.687** -1.893*** 
 (0.398) (1032.6) (1.569) (0.541) 
     
Colonizer 0.119 768.2** 0.412 0.877*** 
 (0.0998) (257.9) (0.391) (0.136) 
     
Remoteness and 
Insularity 
0.0193 -9166.3*** -3.154 -0.515 
 (0.453) (1171.4) (1.790) (0.616) 
     
Official Development 
Assistance 
0.0333 -576.2*** 0.376** 0.321*** 
 (0.0345) (89.08) (0.140) (0.0469) 
     
Trade Openness 0.0243*** 39.12* -0.0312 -0.0378*** 
 (0.00696) (18.08) (0.0274) (0.00946) 
     
Natural Disaster -0.642 2690.4* -4.411* -3.656*** 
 (0.434) (1125.0) (1.710) (0.590) 
     
Natural resource 
rent 
-0.0588* -164.1* 0.0351 -0.00387 
 (0.0298) (76.88) (0.117) (0.0404) 
     
High-technology 
manufactured 
-0.00860 194.5*** 0.135** 0.0159 
 (0.0130) (34.09) (0.0510) (0.0176) 
     
constant 3.495*** 6039.6* 35.43*** 23.15*** 
 (0.921) (2398.8) (3.620) (1.251) 
N 436 431 428 436 
R2 0.066 0.405 0.107 0.301 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 7: Pooled OLS – Accumulated Models. 
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What is the best model? Table 7 shows four accumulated multiple linear regression 
models: each model regressing main independent variables and control variables. On the basis 
of R-squared, model number four is a good robust model in comparison with the rest. It has an 
estimated R-squared of 0.301*100 which is equivalent to 30.1 percent. Also, model four is the 
only model with a significant correlation with the main independent variable, term limit.   
Other models have a poor outcome after regressing the variables. Model one for 
intance, which consist of our variables of interest, namely term limits and GDP economic 
growth, has the least R-squared of 0.066*100 = 6 percent. This shows the model is poor and 
less robust. The estimated relationship between predictor variables and GDP economic 
growth are not statistically significant.  When attempting to remove non-significant variables 
from the model to measure the robustness, this would increase the strength of the association 
but also increase the level of bias.  
Therefore, for SIS, model four is likely to be a good reliable model. But the results that 
consist of multiple variables could possibly be overlooked, particularly if the issue of missing 
values is given emphasis. In the next section, the discussion, I try to match the results with the 
theory of principle-agent as well as adding literature based on the model.   
 
5.3. Robustness Check  
In this section the study examines how does the regression coefficient estimate change 
when the regression specification is modified by removing SIS with a population above 1.5 
million. Here, we conceptualize the smallness of SIS with the population number set by 
Commonwealth and World Bank (2000) of 1.5 million. Therefore, from a panel of thirty-four 
SIS, six of them are removed namely; Singapore, Guinea and Bissau, Jamaica, Ireland, 
Dominican Republic and Papua New Guinea This leaves us with 28 SIS which have the 
population of 1.5 million and below, making it possible for robust regression.  
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
       CatTL |   -.8439308    -.6090979       -.2348329        .6417583 
         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
         B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.13 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.7144 
Table 8: Hausman test  - Robustness check. 
 
From the table 8, the Hausman test shows a p-value of 0.71which is above 0.05, hence fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. Based on the this Hausman test result, we favor random effect 
model for our simple linear regression.  
a. Simple linear regression.  
 (1) 
 DGDPGrowthrate 
CatTL -0.609 
 (0.545) 
  
_cons 3.580*** 
 (0.484) 
N 668 
R2 0.0016 
 
Table 9:  Random effect: term limit and GDP growth rate 
Table 9 shows that there is no statistical correlations between term limits and GDP 
economic growth rate, even after removing SIS above 1.5 million. Having observe similar 
results before and after robustness check, it shows that our results are robust. Despite of 
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changing regression specification, the coefficient estimates remain behaving the same. 
Therefore, the findings strengthen the conclusion that term limits do not impact GDP 
economic growth.   
 
b. Multivariate Regression  
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
--- 
       CatTL |     .992976     .6445598        .3484162        1.166594 
   NetODAGNI |    .0036468      .048162       -.0445152        .0411768 
TradeOpenn~s |    .0253929     .0264138       -.0010209        .0180904 
Naturalres~t |    .1197446     .0139515        .1057931         .080828 
Hightechno~d |    .0401539     .0170056        .0231484        .0145959 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
         B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        7.55 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1831  
Table 10: Hausman test – Multivariate regression – Robustness check 
For the Hausman test, the p-value of 0.18 shows we fail to reject the null hypothesis and 
hence finding random effect as a good model to regress the model.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GDP Growthrate GDP per capita Revenue GDP Spending GDP 
Term Limits 0.645 827.1 -7.674* 0.290 
 (0.739) (1629.8) (3.344) (1.072) 
     
Colonizer 0.0327 49.14 0.831 0.890 
 (0.199) (843.1) (0.915) (0.557) 
     
Remoteness 
and Insularity 
-0.0501 -6003.4 2.225 2.351 
 (0.991) (3932.6) (4.566) (2.596) 
     
ODA 0.0482 -175.9* 0.504* 0.286*** 
 (0.0486) (81.45) (0.217) (0.0535) 
     
Trade 
Openness 
0.0264 28.74 0.112 -0.0258 
 (0.0187) (32.96) (0.0817) (0.0216) 
     
Natural 
Disaster 
0.369 2844.1 -7.855* -7.291*** 
 (0.816) (3311.7) (3.732) (2.186) 
     
Natural 
resource rent 
0.0140 521.9*** -0.271 -0.507*** 
 (0.0618) (124.9) (0.273) (0.0821) 
     
High-
technology 
export 
0.0170 279.7*** 0.0801 0.0187 
 (0.0203) (32.53) (0.0890) (0.0213) 
     
_cons 0.729 1768.4 36.33*** 28.69*** 
 (1.885) (5900.6) (8.435) (3.891) 
N 350 345 343 350 
R2 0.0132 0.2153 0.1414 0.2144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 11. Pooled OLS – Robustness check  
 
i. Interpretation of Model 1. GDP Growth rate.  
The result of model 1 is robust. The model indicates no strong the relationship 
between independent variables and GDP growth rate, holding control variables constant. 
The estimate coefficient shows a positive correlation between term limits and GDP 
growth rate, holding other control variables constant, but not significant relationship.  
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For the control variables, result indicates changes of coefficient estimates when 
certain regression specifications (six countries) are removed from the panel, holding other 
predictors constant. Previously, we managed to observe significant correlation between 
predictors, trade openness and natural resources, when the bar of population is set to 10 
million, but when the population bar is lowered to 1.5 million then such correlation does 
not exist. This changes may suggest that trade openness and natural resources decreases 
its strengths when the population of SIS is below 1.5 million.  
To comment on the R-squared and the strength of the model overall, the results are 
robust and plausible. The reason is even after isolating six SIS with higher population to 
10 million, most coefficient estimates remain unchanged and the model still remains poor, 
having a score of R-squared 0.0132 under robustness check, closely similar to 0.66 R-
squared of thirty-four SIS (see table 7).   
 
ii. Interpretation of Model 2. GDP per capita.  
In model 2 result indicates a presence of robustness as far variables of interest 
(term limits and GDP per capita) are concerned, while holding control variables constant. 
The coefficients of the two models, 34-SIS model and 28-SIS model, shows similarly 
positive relationship between the variables with notable differences in coefficient units 
nonetheless. This tells us that the coefficient of the two variables behave the same even 
after removing some individual countries from the regression, hence valid correlations. 
For the controls, there are observable robustness to three predictor variables, High 
technology manufactured export, natural resource and ODA. The coefficient estimate of 
the variable still suggests strong correlations in spite of dropping some regression 
specification, while holding other independent variables constant. However, there are 
changes of coefficient estimate to variables such as remoteness and historical colonizer 
which may implicate different interpretation. The two mentioned variables lack robustness 
because the estimate coefficient behaves differently when SIS with 10 million are 
removed from the regression. It minimizes the confidence to rectify the variables as 
significant.  
For the R-squared, the findings show the model has a 0.2153 which has changed 
after dropping some countries. The R-squares has decreases by 0.19 which might 
somewhat minimize our confidence to declare that is model is strongly robust. Perhaps in-
depth studies are needed for this model.  
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iii. Interpretation of Model 3. Revenue GDP.  
The estimate coefficient of robust-check model indicates the existence of 
robustness in this model. The coefficient estimate of robust-check shows a significant 
relationship between term limits and revenue to GDP, holding controls constant, similarly 
to 34-SIS coefficient outcome. Both of the coefficient estimates have a p-value that is 
below 0.05, thus robust. This model is likely to be the most robust finding for our study in 
relations to term limits. 
For the control variables, only the relationship between natural disaster and 
revenue to GDP is robust with coefficient that indicates statistical significant relationship, 
holding other explanatory variables. The estimate coefficient of high manufactured 
technology and ODA changes and loses their significance when six SIS are eliminated 
from the regression. The change of coefficient estimates of ODA and high technology 
export due to dropping of six SIS indicates that results of our model is less robust to these 
variables.  
The outcome of R-squared has not changed a lot, from 0.107 (of 34 SIS) to 0.1414 
(of 28 SIS) which simply indicates that both of the findings are poor. Based on similar 
poorness of the model, it then provides sufficient ground evidence to claim that this model 
overall is robust.  
 
iv. Interpretation of Model 4. Spending to GDP.  
The fourth model explores interesting findings. While there was a strong statistical 
relationship between term limits and spending to GDP (holding controls variables), the 
robust-check regression shows no such relationship exist, making our model less robust. 
The coefficient estimate has significantly changes when six countries that have high 
population of 10 million are removed from the regression.  
Moreover, when dealing with control variables we find that the estimate 
coefficient of natural resources behaves differently by having significant correlations 
when there is reduction of SIS with 10 million population size, emphasizing that our 
model likely not robust, holding other predictors constant. Similar results to trade 
openness and historical colonizer. However, ODA and natural disaster remained statistical 
significant despite the removal of some SIS, hence robust control variables to spending to 
GDP.  
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When observing the R-squared results of both regressions, 34 SIS regression and 
28 SIS regression, it is convincing to argue that there is less of robustness to the model. 
The reason is, the R-squared units have dropped by on average of 9 percent which reduces 
the confidence to announce the model as strongly robust.   
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SECTION 6. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
In this section I adopt a method of question and answer in explaining the overall finding of 
this study as well as a way of referring to back to research question, hypothesis and puzzles 
posed at the beginning of this thesis.  
a. What have been the major finding(s) of this particular study? 
The results of this study are two folded. Firstly, the study has failed to reject the null 
hypothesis, which means, there is no association between term limits and GDP economic 
growth rate in SIS. We manage to observe that countries of SIS, with either limited or 
unlimited terms could not impact the GDP growth rate. The findings are robust and plausible 
after performing the robustness check regression that removed six SIS with a population 
above 1.5 million, and showed no significant changes in estimate coefficient.  
Secondly, the the study managed to identify strong correlations in spending to GDP 
and Revenue to GDP. Revenue to GDP had robust results in relations to term limits, making 
an important discovery in this study for society (voters) and scholars to consider. The result 
showed the longer the incumbents stays on power, the lower the revenue to GDP decreases. 
Therefore, SIS should encourage limited terms and changing of candidates in order to 
increase the amount of revenue to GDP. The methods and rules of collecting tax and fiscal 
revenues needs a dynamic body to emphasize its implementation (Landefeld, Seskin & 
Fraumeni, 2008). A dynamic body could imply to change of government with new mentality, 
which is achievable under limited terms.  
For spending to GDP, the model showed strong correlations with term limit but not 
robust when some countries (Singapore, Guinea and Bissau, Jamaica, Ireland, Dominican 
Republic and Papua New Guinea) are excluded from the panel regression. Also, the model 
had significant correlations to most of predictor variables. The model overall tells us that for 
SIS especially with higher number of population exceeding 1.5; the longer the incumbent 
stays in power, the lower spending to GDP decreases, which is bad for economy. The 
governments need to be capable of spending more in order to bring development to its society 
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(Ramey, Zubeiry, 2014). The model also shows the robust result on natural disasters and 
natural resource that are statistically important to consider.  
 
b. How does the finding of this study reveal new gaps in the literature?  
The findings are promising and contribute to filling the gaps in the empirical literature 
that had not been adequately described in the past in relation to SIS. The results tell us that 
scholars from neither of the two camps listed in the literature review section, orthodox and 
unorthodox, support our findings of SIS between term limit and GDP growth rate. The camps 
from the literature review were divided into two parts: scholars in favor of fixed term, and 
scholars in favor of unfixed terms in facilitating GDP economic growth rate. The results in 
SIS show neither term limits nor unlimited could impact GDP growth rate. The study 
conclusions depart away from merely orthodox and unorthodox scholars. The finding creates 
perhaps a third way of thinking away from GDP economic growth rate and term limits. The 
findings indicate that term limits is not all that matters for economic growth in SIS. In fact, a 
SIS with either limited terms or unlimited does not guarantee the probability of having a rapid 
GDP economic growth rate, regardless of the size of the population.  
There are two dependent variables, namely spending-to-GDP and revenue to GDP, 
with strong correlations to term limits and reflects to the literature. Firstly, the study strongly 
fills the gaps in relations to term limit and revenue to GDP. We discover that term limits 
impact the changes of revenue to GDP; when the incumbent gets reelected repeatedly, the 
revenue to GDP deceases. This finding is supported by Crain and Tollison (1993); Johnson 
and Crain (2004); Besley and Case (1995) who empirically explored the presence of term 
limit and revenue to GDP and consent that such relationship exists. These scholars advocated 
the urgency of having limited term for the revenue to GDP to increase.  
To complement the literature that explored the correlations between term limits and 
spending-to-GDP in large states (Besley and Case, 2003; Payne, 1991; Reed et all, 1998; 
Tanzi, 2004; Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti, 2011), this study has interesting findings on SIS, 
which fill the gaps in empirical science studies. The findings of this study are in line with 
what Besley and Case (2003) argued in their study focused on the U.S: term-limited 
governors (in our case new candidates) tend to significantly increase the spending of the state. 
Our study also rejects the stance that Payne (1991) and Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) once 
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advocated. However, this finding is not robust; its evidence works only when all thirty-four 
SIS are included in the analysis and not otherwise.    
 
c. Theory and effect of the findings.  
What do the findings tell us about the principal-agent theory and the hypothesis?  
In relations to principal agent theory, the findings could be interpreted that voters should not 
focus too much on examining the effectiveness or the shirking of the incumbent regarding the 
desire to achieve high GDP economic growth. This should not be understood to mean that 
voter filtering for a competent leader is a total waste of time, especially for SIS where the 
pool of competent leaders is narrow. Instead, as the findings suggest, voters from the thirty-
four SIS panel should focus their preferences on spending to GDP and revenue to GDP when 
filtering their candidate. This means, voters (principal) should use the scope of spending to 
GDP and revenue to GDP to measure the efficiency of a leader (agent) before (re)electing for 
office. And so, after these findings, the principal-agent theory has identified the normative 
and empirical stance for voters to consider in the election.  
 
d. Do the findings provide Answers to the research puzzle of the thesis?  
For the recent cases of constitutional reform on term limits that occurred in Comoros 
and the Dominican Republic in 2009 and 2015, respectively, which by and large were driven 
to fuel economic growth (Crosby, 2015; Zovatto, 2016; Chatham House, 2009), based on the 
results obtained in this study, such changes are fruitless to GDP growth rate. Therefore, the 
chances of either Comoros or Dominican Republic succeeding in economic growth because of 
the change of term limits are very small.  
Dominican Republics may wish to consider revenue to GDP as a robust model when 
re-assessing their decision. Based on the findings, there are likely chances for the revenue to 
GDP to drop when the incumbent, Denilo Medina, continuously gets reelected. Nevertheless, 
since Dominican Republic has an average population of 10 million, there is a probability for 
spending to GDP to decrease over time when the incumbent remains in power. 
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For Comoros, under limited term that the country has selected in their reformed 
constitution, we can predict that their revenue to GDP may increase over time. For the 
spending to GDP are also chances for spending to GDP to increase. The prediction of revenue 
to GDP also applies to all-limited-terms SIS included in the panel without regard to 
population size.   
 
e. Can we use the results from this study to estimate term limits and the GDP 
economic growth of SIS that we did not either observe or include in this research?  
The answer to this is; it depends on (a) the conceptualization of smallness of island 
state in terms of population, (b) data availability. By explaining (a) If a researcher for example 
want to find the relationship between term limits and economic growth to SIS countries that 
are beyond 10 million, then this results cannot be reliable, as the study explicitly binds within 
10 million population size. To elaborate (b) - this study suffered from missing data problem, 
therefore, if the unobserved group of countries have sufficient data, the relationship between 
and GDP economic growth may differ with the results of this study. However, to most of 
cases, Small Island States does not exceed 10 million population size, and most of SIS have 
the problem of missing value due to the reasons mentioned earlier in this study. Therefore, if 
that is the case, then we can rely and use the results from this study to estimate term limits and 
GDP economic growth. The results regarding the relationship between term limit and GDP 
economic growth are strengthened with robustness check regression, which makes it a good 
evidence to depend on.   
 
f. What have been the limitations of this study?  
 Every study has limitations despite the efforts of the researcher to avoid them 
(Wiersma, W. 2000; Hsiao, 2007). In this study, I identify two potential limitations and 
weaknesses that could perhaps impact the result of null hypothesis topic and possibly the 
overall validity of the results.  
The first limitation is regarding data. Variables such as high-technology, revenue-to-
GDP, GDP per capita, trade openness and GDP per capita were recorded in most of database 
engines but most of them consist of a high number of missing values. Lack of getting access 
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to record the data from a trusted source such as government is one of the reasons why the data 
are missing. In attempting to minimize the limitation, the study collected data from the 
alternative secondary yet reliable sources to fill in the gaps. This helped massively in fixing 
the empty gaps, but still, some data were not possible to find even in alternative sources, 
hence left blank  
The second limitation is the presence of a number of categorical variables that lead to 
the loss of important information (Myers & Well, 2003; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The study 
consists of four categorical variables—term limit, natural disasters, colonizer and remoteness 
& insularity—to simplify statistical analysis. However, limiting the study into categories 
could result in the variable reducing its statistical power, which could otherwise detect a 
significant relationship between, for example, natural disasters and GDP economic growth. 
Categorizing the aforementioned variables into two groups (example remoteness variable) or 
seven group (example historical colonizer) could increase the risk of a positive result being a 
false positive and vice-versa.  
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SECTION 7. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The essence of this study was to address the conflicting puzzle of term limits and its influence 
on economic growth in countries that are less exposed, the Small Island States. The study 
considered panel data model - Pooled OLS, across 34 Small Island States to monitor a larger 
number of observations over time, 1987 to 2010. 
 
a. Conclusion on the theory.  
The Small Island States are currently undergoing highly sensitive economic and 
political reforms, particularly by adjusting term limits through constitution to stimulate the 
economy. Candidates running for executive post and voters are in a dilemma as to what fits 
the best between unlimited terms and fixed terms vis-à-vis economic progress. The principal- 
agent theory has helped us to elucidate the conflicting logics that underpin the positions held 
by the different actors. In this way, the theory has allowed us to conceptualize the needs and 
the position of the voters ‘principal’ in (re)-electing the competent candidate and the agent’s 
utilization of information as well as the possibility for the agent to shirk. The application of 
principal-agent theory in this study should not be taken as a means to prove the theory, weak 
or not. On the contrary, the usage of theory is set out to illustrate that both actors, voters and 
candidates, have intrinsically sound positions in choosing either fixed or unlimited terms, 
based on policy choices and implantations, and the economic vulnerabilities of the island. In 
this regard, through the lens of the theory, the results have indicated that the choice of 
reelecting an incumbent could not increase the probability of having a higher GDP economic 
growth rate, and also the choice of electing a new candidate could not increase the probability 
of greater GDP economic growth.  
b. Conclusion of the findings.  
I established a main hypothesis for this study, which, after regression, I failed to reject. 
However, alternative supportive models revive the probability of having better economies in 
SIS. A model that contained the two variables of interest, term limit and GDP economic 
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growth rate, had no statistically significant result even after robustness check. The best model 
that include all countries in our study is spending-to-GDP. The model indicates the presence 
of strong relationship between term limits and spending to GDP. When considering 
robustness check in multivariate regression, revenue to GDP remains as the only model that 
has statistical significance with term limits. By holding other predictors, the conclusion 
suggests that limited term has positive impacts to revenue to GDP. Therefore, SIS, 
particularly voters should keep emphasis on revenue to GDP model in their preferences as far 
as term limit is concerned. 
There are a number of limitations regarding the study design, data collection, and 
possibly variable and countries' selection. For instance, the data collected indicated the 
problem of missing values that perhaps have resulted to misleading conclusion. Even if the 
robustness check assisted in rectifying our findings, the issue of missing data is worth 
mentioning, nonetheless.   
c. Suggestions.  
After observing the findings of this study, I offer my suggestions in two important 
areas; the decision-making bodies of SIS and to scholars and researchers of political science 
and economy.  
i. Decision making bodies.  
Instead of explicitly debating term limit and GDP economic growth, SIS governing 
bodies should encourage voters to oversee other economic determinants such as spending to 
GDP and revenue to GDP when (re)electing candidates. This encouragement process can be 
done by educating the voters on how to measure the overall performance of their economy 
and why spending to GDP and revenue to GDP are good models gauge the performance of the 
leader. By doing this, most of SIS may perform well in economy, beyond resilience.   
Also, the governing bodies should look at diverse factors such as more engaging to 
Official Development Assistance, taking combative measure against natural disasters and 
openness to trade in international arenas as a means to fuel economic performance. For 
example in trade openness, in an interview aired by Channel News Asia, Tommy Koh, 
Ambassador-at-Large for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, suggested SIS could 
either formulate trade forum initiatives or join regional trade unions to amplify their economy 
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and advance SIS interests in the world.22 Moreover, other relevant sectors in SIS capacity 
could work on their advantages as these are capable of determining GDP per capita, revenue 
to GDP and spending-to-GDP. Policy makers may tie these positive factors together, 
alongside other external factors to the island, to pursue economic goals.  
ii. Venue for future studies. 
Building on the findings of this study three areas should be given serious focus in 
future studies as far as SIS are concerned. Firstly, I suggest future studies could look at the 
influence and the changing of political parties in determining economic performance, instead 
of term limit. Often, most islands have a long-ruling political party that stays in power, such 
as in Jamaica and Guinea Bissau. But these long standing ruling parties, most of them started 
ruling since independence, have recently been losing in elections allowing new parties in 
office. Hence, in relation to the economic growth, researchers could compare island states 
with a simultaneous change in political parties to islands with one or two ruling parties since 
independence. Perhaps the results could be more promising.  
The second suggestion for further research is regarding natural resources and term 
limits. In this study, there was little exploration regarding natural resource rent despite the fact 
that most SIS contain various natural resources (Weeks & Adams, 2017. Perhaps because 
natural resource was just a control variable. In all of our four models, only the third model 
showed a statistically significant correlation with revenue-to-GDP, unlike other variables 
which had a minimum of two associations. This probably rises a question of interest because 
in an ideal world, the most generous assumption would be that having natural resources 
accelerates economic growth at a rapid pace, particularly in SIS with a small population. 
What happens in SIS regarding natural resources and economic performance? 
 Last but not least, the study limited itself to sovereign Small Island States. Yet there 
are a vast number of Small Island States that are not sovereign, semi-autonomous, and 
immensely marginalized in literature. Some of these islands are not even know that they exist. 
Therefore, it might be worth exploring how term limits and economic growth work in non-
sovereign Small Island States. 
 
                                                            
22 Channel News Asia (2015, September 29). Diplomacy of Small States. Perspective Insider [Video File]. 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nokRHd7Z1zw&t=60s 
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